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Abstract
This thesis seeks to contribute to the important debate regarding whether who governs
matter, and if the relationship between the government and labor unions affect economic
performance. The research question is: "Did changes in the organization of labor in the
1980s lead to changes in the partisan influence on economic outcomes in Sweden in the
1990s?" To answer this a case-study of Sweden centered around the 1980s is conducted,
a period in which this highly social democratic country underwent several changes to its
economic system; a shift away from its corporatist roots.
Corporatism, the cooperation between government and labor unions, is first examined
theoretically through identification of partisan strategies for growth and class alignment.
These are situated in a European context between 1975 and 1995, and the Swedish
welfare-model is discussed. Further, the case-study shows how Sweden developed from
a post-war welfare-system to a notably less corporatist system by the end of this period.
Sweden is historically regarded as an example of a markedly corporatist country, and in
Europe it is thus an unexpected case of a decline in corporatism. The thesis shows how
changes to the organization of labor in the 1980s had consequences for economic per-
formance, and this performance is discussed in the context of Europe, Scandinavia, and
Sweden. The economic performance of the 1990s is related to changes in the 1980s, and
the development between the periods analysed using a path-dependent methodological
perspective. The development illustrates how the decline in Swedish corporatism had
implications for subsequent performance.
In the 1980s this is best explained by the dissolvement of centralized bargaining between
labor unions and employer organizations. The institutional linkage between the left-
party and labor, which remained strong from the 1950s to the start of the 1980s, appears
weakened as a result of shifts in government power. With this came new policies, and
I
the economic system moved towards market liberalism.
Economic turmoil increased in the 1990s, starting with a banking crisis spanning Scan-
dinavia, and the cause of this is traced to policies of the preceding decade. In a country
with a long history of stable economic performance through cooperation between a leftist
government and an encompassing labor, these changes and shocks were not expected, but
they point to a broader decline in corporatism; a result of economic crises and changes
to the political control over the economy.
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1 Introduction
The question "Does Who Governs Matter?" have been asked in many forms over the
years by students of politics (see Lange and Garrett 1985; Fox 1988; Cameron 1988;
Esping-Andersen 1990; Drezner 2001). In this thesis I aim to answer this question by
studying the relationship between government and labor. My research question is the
following:
Did changes in the organization of labor in the 1980s lead to changes in
the partisan influence on economic outcomes in Sweden in the 1980s and
1990s?
I argue that the relationship between the government and labor in Sweden changed in the
1980s. The central argument of the thesis is that economic outcomes are explained by
changes in labor unions, not just partisan policies, and that a change in the mechanisms
of this relationship also changed political latitude to shape economic policy. Parties of
the left and right necessarily have to maneuver this political space when formulating
policy, and changes in these mechanisms explain the political impact on the economy.
I will examine whether developments of the 1980s in the economic system and the or-
ganization of labor have changed economic performance in a country typically regarded
as corporatist in nature. The thesis relates to present-day debates on the state’s role in
the economy and how economic policies impact welfare and growth. To identify both
the impact and the changes the problem must be contextualized properly: I examine
the period prior and subsequent to the 1980s to show the development of corporatism
historically. Sweden is selected because of its prominent position as highly corporatist,
both in comparison to the other Nordic countries and Europe (Esping-Andersen 1990:
114).
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The development between the periods take the form of a historical narrative, where
changes are analysed as path-dependent – that is, to some degree inevitable. For clarity
I distinguish systemic changes from external shocks to the economy, as Sweden experi-
enced both. Though the approach is mainly qualitative in nature, quantitative data is also
employed to illustrate the impact of these changes and shocks. The data ranges from the
1950s to the end of the 1990s – where available – to fully show these impacts in a broad
historical context.
This is then a longitudinal case-study of Sweden centered around the 1980s and early
1990s, a period in which structural political and economic changes occurred, as well as
economic shocks. Institutional impact is examined and analysed alongside the political
and economic, to account for the relationship between the government and labor. The
ultimate goal is to show how the Swedish welfare-state developed, and how the changes
and shocks of the 1980s and 1990s impacted this.
1.1 Academic relevance
My initial focus when I started working on this thesis was the long-term development
of economic inequality and its relation to policy, a broad topic which I approached with
a broad mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods, on multiple empirical levels.
When it became clear that covering this from the 1980s and into the 2000s could not
sufficiently be done in 80-100 pages, I moved towards studying economic policies of the
1980s. After an evaluation of countries which are clearly relevant in this vein – the United
States and England – it became necessary to select a case, or limited number of cases, in
which this development was less obvious. In terms of policies, historical position, and
empirical material, this would be the Nordic countries. As explained in the case-study
and the analysis, Sweden was the most prominent case of social democratic corporatism
in the examined time period, and accounting for changes within this political system
helps to identify structural changes which reveal a potential decline in corporatism.
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1.1.1 Corporatism and contribution
Corporatism is often associated with the bureaucratic functions within institutions, and
how they relate to the state. I use it as a concept of interaction between labor, capital, and
the state, thus explaining the role played by interest-groups and the state in determining
economic policy. It is applicable to a broader analysis of the relationship between the
political and the economic, and how this relationship can constrain the political latitude
for economic policy.
For many the 1980s is a historical period of economic deregulation as a response to the
laggard growth of the 1970s. Contextually, the most apparent examples of this was under
Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. My
interest in Sweden is motivated by what it appears to have been in this context: A case
of a country least likely to follow the policies instituted by the aforementioned countries,
and one which for most of the post-war period had sustained an economically viable
welfare state. As will be shown, the cooperation between the left side of politics and the
labor unions helped sustain both stable growth and low unemployment.
The contribution made to the field of comparative political economy is first of all a ret-
rospective on the development of Sweden as a welfare-state and in terms of economic
performance. As it was a country least likely to follow the development of the more
economically liberal countries, the changes identified are all the more important. This
development was unexpected in a historical perspective, as it is – along with its Nordic
neighbours – regarded as an extensive welfare state. On the surface, the economic per-
formance of Sweden throughout the 1970s does not indicate a need for systemic change
to its economy.
Further, the relevance for the "real world" (see King et al. 1994: 15) of this thesis is
that the empirical and systemic situation of Sweden prior to the 1980s appears as an
alternative to the current status quo of limited political influence on the economy. The
focus on low unemployment in combination with stable inflation and high growth, as
was the model from the 1950s to the late 1970s, should be desirable for many countries,
and importantly this performance was sustained for a long period of time.
Finally, I find that Sweden as a case of a decline in corporatism is a perspective on
economic inequality. The cooperation between the left and labor for a long time ensured
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that growth in wages followed increases in costs of living. In the long-term this became
unviable, as I discuss throughout the thesis, but the larger question is whether labor
unions could again function as a check on wage-differentiation. That is, the development
of wages which occurred in Sweden prior to the 1980s may be a desirable way to lower
income inequality also in modernity.
1.2 Structure of the thesis
In chapter 2 relevant theoretical perspectives are discussed, and necessary assumptions
and conditions for the empirical relevance of an explanatory, general welfare-model
specified. These are then related to the research question, and a literature review is
conducted.
Chapter 3 outlines how corporatism is studied, what sources of data are used, and the
method applied. An analytical framework is specified, and the validity of the chosen
method discussed.
The first half of the case-study is in chapter 4, where the relationship between the govern-
ment and labor is further developed. This includes a historical narrative and a discussion
of whether a decline in corporatism can be identified.
The second half of the case-study is in chapter 5. Here Sweden is placed in the context
of Europe and of economically advanced democracies, and subsequently Scandinavia,
to show how economic performance changed over time. Based on this implications for
the analysis are discussed.
In chapter 6 the development is examined in terms of path-dependence and causality.
The implications of this, and the consequences for the Swedish case and welfare-model,
are discussed and a decline in corporatism considered.
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2 Theory
The left-right divide in economic policies is typically identified by diverging strategies
for achieving economic growth: The right follows a conservative strategy of tax-cuts,
and the left a liberal strategy of increasing the production rate of labor and capital (Boix
1998). A facet of this is the degree to which government can and will intervene in the
economy, where the right is expected to pursue a laissez-faire doctrine whilst the left
is expected to intervene to ensure more redistribution of wealth and risk (Alvarez et al.
1991: 539). Thus, from the outset partisan policies are assumed.
A trade-off supposedly exists where less intervention yields more efficiency and more in-
tervention yields more security and stability. The implication is that rightist government
prefers freer markets whereas leftist governments prefer more social security. Parties
preferences for market freedom are constrained by the viability of their political strate-
gies – that is, policies – for achieving growth. That is to say, who governs matter for
economic performance mainly where there are differences in economic policy, and these
policies are limited by what policy can achieve in a relatively free market.
To identify the development of these constraints over time, I evaluate the role played
the government in the economic changes of the 1980s, expressed as a model of political
latitude to instigate economic policy. The development of this model is later applied to
distinct periods of historical development, where the application of the model relies on
a set of assumptions and conditions, as defined below.
This chapter is structured as follows: I begin with an outline of the theoretical scope of
the argument, the assumptions it relies on, and how the theoretical perspectives relate
to the research question. Further, a literature review is conducted which focuses on two
prominent theoretical perspectives, their implications for the argument, and specifically
on a debate between Garrett et al and Jackman.
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2.1 Theoretical scope and perspectives
Two concepts should be clarified immediately: Corporatism and latitude. The latter is
defined as the scope for freedom of action, and in this thesis refers to the possible policy-
choices available to politicians at any given time. It is the policy-choices politicians can
make which directly affect the economy, essentially the political control over it. Thus it
explains the leeway or maneuverability politicians have in relieving economic problems
through political means. This concept also includes a negative scope in the form of
constraints on political action. Note that a line will not be drawn between latitude and
constraints, as the concept does not lend itself to such clarity. Rather, it is an evolving
perspective on what can and can not be achieved with economic policy, and thus highlight
how and why politics matter for economic performance.
An example of political latitude would be the governments ability to change the inflation-
rate by setting an interest-rate for the central bank to use. Policy changing this rate to
deal with inflation – or unemployment, as discussed below – are an important tool in
controlling the stability of the economy, especially against shocks. Politicians ability to
change this rate would be constrained by an independent central bank, as discussed in
section 6.3.1. Hence, in this thesis political latitude describes what policy can and can
not achieve in regards to controlling the economy.
Corporatism is often associated with political systems or bureaucratic functions, but its
use here follows Schmitter (1974) and is the institutional linkage between government
and labor. More specifically, this thesis evaluates it as a dimension with social demo-
cratic corporatism at one end of the spectrum and market liberalism at the other. It is the
interaction between a government of the left or right with labor, as well as the govern-
ments preference for such a linkage, and what policies this entails. As the difference in
economic performance is judged empirically, the use of the concept avoids a normative
interpretation. Corporatism is then defined as a political system in which interest-groups
play a part in policy-making, and through this express the preferences of their members
for economic policies.
Further, economic performance is a composite empirical measure consisting of growth,
unemployment, and inflation. It will be referred to as a general phenomena at various
points throughout the thesis, but it is assumed to always be sensitive to systemic changes
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and economic shocks, which are specified empirically. The interaction between gov-
ernment and interest-groups, expressed empirically through wage-bargaining with labor
unions, defines the characteristic mechanism of social democratic corporatist systems.
The aforementioned model defines the setting in which the central argument applies.
First, the setting for the analysis is a political situation with free elections and a relatively
free economy – that is, a capitalist democracy (see Schmidt 1982a); Second, parties of
the left and right have partisan policies which they will pursue if elected, and as such
primarily seek election and secondarily seek to implement these policies if elected; Third,
elected governments have the political capital and capability to implement these policies,
and can achieve the formulated goals of their policies with some success; Fourth, the
political and economic constraints may vary a lot when applied to specific countries, but
can be deduced from theoretical perspectives and verified by case-analysis; Fifth, the
policy-preferences of the left and right reflect the policy-preferences of voter-groups,
and will in highly corporatist systems also be reflected through interest-groups which
political parties align with.
In what follows, each of these conditions are developed and their relation to the central
argument specified.
2.1.1 Democracy and capitalism
The analysis is limited to democracies of a capitalist nature, and the reason for this
is two-fold: Examining differences in partisan policy necessarily requires parties with
distinct policies. A prerequisite for distinct policies is first of all a competitive electoral
regime, where electoral victory gives control of government. Second, if the policies of
the competing parties are similar or near-identical, there is little value in voting for any
of them as the outcome would not differ. Hence, the democracy must – in Dahl’s terms
– allow both public contestation and all citizens to participate in elections and office
(1971).
The other facet of this is capitalism, which is presumed to be necessary because its
essential function is to facilitate growth (Schumpeter 1942). As the dependent variable
is economic performance, of which growth is a part of, variance in this outcome must be
present for an analysis to be valuable. This does not, however, exclude countries whose
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economies do not perfectly resemble the capitalist ideals of the United States. To account
for why who governs matters a comparative ideal must be established, and as my focus is
on the impact on economic performance, a high degree of democracy and a high degree
of capitalism must be assumed.
There is an inherent question of what high degree implies here, as neither democracy nor
capitalism are necessarily binary concepts (Collier and Levitsky 1997). I will expand
upon this point in section 2.2, but for now it should suffice to say that a high degree of
both will produce a situation with political competition and relatively variable economic
performance, thus excluding political systems of varieties such as one-party systems,
authoritative systems, plan-economies, or the like.
2.1.2 Who Governs: The economic impact of political latitude
As specified above, political parties are assumed to have distinct economic policies. This
assumption is necessary if there is to be any applicability to the argument, but more im-
portantly if there is to be any value to politics. Even if who governs matters, what explains
partisan efficacy in attaining economic performance must be answered. If the economic
factors growth, inflation, and unemployment are assumed to vary conjuncturally as a
structural aspect of a capitalist economy, what difference the economic policy of the left
or the right makes is left unanswered.
First of all, theory dictates that elections are not won just on the basis of policy-ideas
(Jackman 1987: 255). This is to say that parties must not only convince voters with
their ideas for policies to implement, but likely also make alliances between parties
and with voter-groups. An electoral victory does not itself guarantee that policies are
implemented, hence government strength must be considered explicitly. Passing any
legislation requires a sufficient majority of seats in the legislature, and thus government
cohesion – as defined in section 2.2 – explains economic performance by considering
the political power necessary to pass legislation.
Furthermore, it may be necessary for parties to cater to voter-groups whose political
preferences align with their own. These voters are often represented by, or members
of, an interest-group who will lobby or otherwise try to influence the politics of the
governing party or align themselves with some other party. Crucially, and as fronted by
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Garrett et al (Lange and Garrett 1985), the alliance between the left and encompassing
labor explains economic performance aside from economic factors. I return to their
analysis in section 2.2.
2.1.3 The virtue of collective bargaining
Interest-groups seek to increase their utility by following one of two strategies, as speci-
fied by Olson: "[...] the organization can in principle serve its members either by making
the pie the society produces larger, [...] or alternatively by obtaining larger shares or
slices of the social pie for its members" (1982: 42). However, note a caveat as far as
incentives are concerned: "[...] the incentive for group action dimishes as group size in-
creases [...]" (Olson 1982: 31, original emphasis). If we consider how large labor unions
can distrupt the economy through wage-militancy, it is easy to see that the self-interest
of each organization can affect economic performance negatively. The exception to this,
as specified by Olson (1982: 48) and as extended by Lange and Garret (1985: 795), is
when labor is encompassing and thus has a bigger impact on the economy, as explained
below.
The economic cost of policy for the strategy preferred by either side of politics must be
considered, because welfare – measured for example by unemployment and inflation – is
a trade-off between social security and economic freedom, and trying to increase either
then implies a cost to the other. If parties do not vary in their preference for one over the
other, a well-meaning dictator may achieve the same levels of both. This is to say that for
politics to matter for economic performance who governs must necessarily matter, and
because there are tangible differences in empirical results for both welfare and growth,
partisan politics must be counted as an explanatory factor.
The implication of this is two-fold: First, any constraints on policy-making will affect
both sides of politics, as they limit what can be achieved in both welfare and market
freedom. Second, an analysis of empirical outcomes is contingent upon all of the afore-
mentioned assumptions holding, as well as a comparative focus. How much who governs
matter is likely to only be clear if governments of the left and right are seen in relation
to one another, which necessitates an empirical evaluation.
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2.1.4 Achievable economic performance
If low unemployment is seen as a good for welfare and low inflation as conducive to
stable economic growth, then a trade-off between the two imply a contestable area for
policy. This trade-off is known as the Phillips Curve (Phillips 1958), and it has a corollary
in politics in the sense that the trade-off is affected by political decisions (Hibbs 1977).
Assuming that parties on the left are unemployment-sensitive and parties on the right
are inflation-sensitive (Alvarez et al. 1991: 540), the political economic Phillips curve
explains the policy-choice where lowering unemployment increases inflation, and vice
versa.
In addition to being a constraint on economic policy, this trade-off is a mechanism
by which parties can counter economic shocks in the short-term. Note that a common
distinction is to say that in the short-term few variables change, whilst in the medium-
term several variables can change, and in the long-term everything can change. It is
also important to note that in the long-term the viability of this trade-off decreases,
as explained below. Central bank influence is not explicitly treated here, but whether
government directly controls inflation or cedes the responsibility of this to a central bank
does affect this trade-off. Since central bank independence is largely a phenomenon of
the 1990s and beyond (Glyn 2006: 32), the occurrence of it in a potential case-study
must be considered.
The vertical Phillips-curve
An argument has been made for a viable strategy for full employment (Kalecki 1943;
Boddy and Crotty 1975), based on ideal conditions and with a domestic focus. Empiri-
cally it is evident that no advanced democracy has thus far produced full employment
(International Monetary Fund 2014), in the sense of no unemployment. More importantly,
full employment means that everyone who can be employed are. These democracies have
had their share of leftist governments, many of which have worked towards reducing
unemployment, but none of which have abolished it.
An explanation for this is that Marx’ prediction of a Reserve Army of Labour still holds.
This reserve army is a by-product of capitalism, in that its existence is explained by the
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willingness of the unemployed to work for less wages than the currently employed, doing
the same work (Stilwell 2006: 124). Surplus, or increases in, population thus sustain and
renew this reserve army, and as long as the supply of labor exceeds the demand for labor,
it is a mechanism that keeps "[...] wages down and profits up" (Stilwell 2006: 124), and
it is inherent to capitalism (Marx and McLellan 2008: 352-353).
I will not delve into Marx’ critique of capitalism, but rather note that this mechanism
is of great importance as it highlights a facet of the unemployment-inflation trade-off.
If unemployment is considered a disadvantageous situation for those who currently are,
but also as a loss in efficiency due to the superfluous labor available, it should clearly be
in the interest of either side of politics to keep unemployment low as it is beneficial for
the output of the economy. However, because this mechanism is inherent to capitalism it
can be considered a natural unemployment, that is, structural unemployment.
Long-term unemployment is often explained by a long-term Phillips curve, where efforts
to lower unemployment consequently will lead to a state where inflation is increased but
unemployment returns to the previous level, thus rendering full employment impossible
without spiralling inflation. This, however, is in the indefinite long-term, and reducing
unemployment is still a viable policy-choice in the short- to medium-term.
2.1.5 Class and political alignment
Below I discuss the empirical relationship which suggests that centralized, well-organized,
and politically strong labor movements in combination with a coherent leftist govern-
ment will yield better economic performance than if the labor movement was weak. Why
this should necessarily be the case is uncertain, as interests-groups are not necessarily in
the business of increasing a society’s output.
Interests-groups, whether they are small special-interest lobby groups, worker unions,
or employer-associations, have one purpose: To protect the interests of their members
by ensuring them increased utility relative to the cost of membership. Economically,
this is fairly self-explanatory. If the cost of belonging to a union outweighed the benefit,
it would be irrational to remain a member. This follows from Olson’s strategies for
interest-groups.
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Further, labor unions are mainly interested in ensuring a living wage and increased
welfare for their members. Apart from worker rights, which are not covered here, they do
this by wage-bargaining with employer-associations, and this affects the economic output
of society. Since labor unions are responsible for the most part only to their members,
there is no reason for why they should restrain themselves in this wage-bargaining,
regardless of potential costs imposed on society.
The implication is the following: If the interest-group manages to redistribute more
resources and means to its own members, then it does so at the cost of the rest of society.
Consider, for example, a small labor union which through wage-bargaining secures an
increase in wages. The cost of the wages paid to the workers which the labor union
represents will either be borne by the owner of the business, or passed on to society
in the form of an increase in the price of the goods which the business supplies. All
things equal, it is assumed that increased wages will yield increased prices, and as such
wage-bargaining affects the aggregate price-level in the society.
That is, unless the size of the labor union is encompassing (Olson 1982: 44). Given a
sufficient size of the labor union, whether through a large single organization or a coali-
tion of unions, and a rational leadership, the union will also be interested in increasing
the productivity of society at large. Given the size, which will vary between societies,
the aforementioned cost to society would then be far more likely to also be a cost to
its own members – since it encompasses a much larger part of the society (Olson 1982:
48). Hence, to avoid negative consequences for its members, it has an incentive to show
restraint in wage-bargaining and rather focus on making the pie society produces larger
(Lange and Garrett 1985: 795).
2.2 Literature Review
In what follows I examine how wage-policies, as a mechanism of cooperation between
the left and labor, help explain economic performance and then examine how the work
of Garrett et al and Jackman aid in explaining partisan differences in this outcome.
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2.2.1 Wage-restraint
From the outset there are no obvious reasons for specific outcomes of a wage-bargaining
process, as it is highly dependent on the contextual nature of the current wage-level
as it relates to overall economic performance. To find an explanation for these out-
comes, the cooperation between political parties and interest-groups are often examined
in corporatist systems, as this is an area where wage-bargaining yield wage-policies. A
methodological issue with such an examination is that wage-negotiation, whether it is
between labor and government or labor and employers, is inherently difficult to mea-
sure: The outcome may be relatively easy to ascertain, as wages change relative to the
price-level, but the process itself cannot be quantified to yield the exact outcome. In an
effort to explain what determines wages, be it purely economic factors such as growth,
unemployment, or inflation, or whether wage-negotiation and thus politics play a part,
Armingeon proposes the following hypothesis:
[...] there will be political wage restraint if union bargainers are influenced
by the social democratic party and if the rank and file fail to protest against,
or even agree with, this policy (Armingeon 1982: 235).
In this regard wage-bargaining happens through an institutional linkage between the
government and labor, where particularly the cooperation between labor and the left
manifests. Three major types of this linkage can be identified (Armingeon 1982: 235):
(1) Collective affiliation: Union members automatically become party members.
(2) Ex officio representation: By the virtue of position or status union leadership has
a place in the party executive, or vice versa.
(3) Liason committees: Co-ordinated committees involving both the labor union and
the party.
Empirically the first clearly has some merit, as it existed in Norway, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom, making it an important area for case-analysis, whilst the second and
third more resemble channels of information exchange (Armingeon 1982: 235-236). If
collective affiliation can be determined to be present as a mechanism or in high levels
in the empirical period in question, then any of these countries would be suitable for
determining partisan impacts on economic performance. I return to the left-labor linkage
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and involvement in the wage-setting process in section 6.1.
2.2.2 The Garrett et al and Jackman debate
Between 1985 and 1991, a debate ran between a handful of authors on the efficacy of
economic policies in industrial democracies, and how partisanship, government cohesion,
and labor unions affected economic performance between 1960 and 1984 (Lange and
Garrett 1985; Jackman 1987; Lange and Garrett 1987; Jackman 1989; Garrett and Lange
1989; Alvarez et al. 1991). Garrett et al made the argument that governments of the
left and right have distinct economic policies which they want to implement, and whilst
the left is more focused on keeping unemployment low, the right is focused on keeping
inflation in check. This is consistent with the assumption that either side of politics have
different strategies for achieving economic performance.
Their model explains how a political alliance between parties of the left and organized
labor can yield economic performance on par with what would be expected from a free
market economy. Additionally, they find that the presence or absence of organized labor
explains strong and weak growth (Lange and Garrett 1985). My aim in this section
is to broadly describe the theoretical and empirical basis of their argument, and based
on this develop a comprehension of why these configurations potentially limit political
latitude.
Labor as a social mechanism
Following Olson’s logic of collective action by interest-groups, the authors focus on the
propensity of the labor unions to self-regulate – that is, show wage-restraint. As shown
previously, such behavior is rational for large unions given that they are large enough to
be encompassing. As Lange and Garrett point out, this crucial size is uncertain because
the social- and group-utility of showing such restraint is not determined by the unions
themselves, but rather by the owners of the businesses in which the union-members work
(Lange and Garrett 1985: 796-797), and it will obviously vary between countries.
In contrast to the laissez-faire approach of the right, the left can positively affect both the
wage-negotiation process and the uncertainty of the unions. In this regard who governs
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clearly matters, as it serves not only as a potential mediator of these negotiations, but also
as a distributor of economic growth and thus a guarantor of increased welfare without
necessarily increased inequality.
There is a dual contingency to this mechanism: Enhanced economic performance is only
likely when strong labor unions support a strong leftist party, and in instances of a weak
labor and a strong rightist party. As the welfare-model strongly relies on wage-bargaining
taking form between an organized labor union and employers, mediated by government,
this precondition for enhanced performance is essential to evaluating the model. Lange
and Garrett’s summary is reproduced in table 1, where they also outline four related
hypotheses – marked A to D. If economic performance is not stronger under scenario
A and D than B and C, then the predictive and explanatory power of the model will be
low.
Table 1: Political strength of the left, labor unions and economic growth
Political Strength of the Left
Strong Weak
Encompassing Organization of union movement
(A)
+
(B)
-
Not encompassing
(C)
-
(D)
+
+: positive contribution to economic growth
-: negative contribution to economic growth
Source: Lange and Garrett 1985: 799.
The four hypotheses can briefly be explained as the following:
A When the left controls the government, they reduce uncertainty and hence the risk
of wage-restraint, to the degree that more distribution occurs as unions focus on
making the societal pie larger, rather than obtaining a larger slice of it (Lange and
Garrett 1985: 799).
B With the absence of an assuring left party, unions focus more on obtaining a larger
slice of the pie for their members. Thus wage-restraint is not a beneficial strategy
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in the short-term of an election cycle, and there are no gains from hoping that
business-owners or a government of the right would distribute economic growth –
as they are by definition less likely to do so in comparison to a government of the
left (Lange and Garrett 1985: 800).
C In a situation with no large union, or coalition of unions, each of them will have
little to gain from pursuing any other strategy than to increase the utility of their
members. This is largely because unions bargain with their respective employer,
not on behalf of a larger labor market, and thus have a lesser impact on wages in
aggregate (Lange and Garrett 1985: 800).
D When a strong right government has no organized or significant opposition from
labor unions they can shape the economy closer to the ideal of a free market,
thus creating economic performance at the cost of social distribution (Lange and
Garrett 1985: 800-801).
These are relevant for the empirical analysis, but it should already be noted that – as
Lange and Garrett put it – a linear relationship between economic growth and the pres-
ence or absence of labor power should not be expected (1985: 801). This is to say that
labor is likely not the only explanatory factor for comparatively high economic per-
formance, and there might be cases where growth is achieved in spite of not having a
particularly strong labor movement or strong government.
Performance as the dependent variable
Initially, Garrett et al used economic growth as the only indicator of economic perfor-
mance (Lange and Garrett 1985: 802), and it is also the dependent variable in their anal-
ysis. Later, this performance included "annual rates of gross domestic product growth,
change in the annual rate of the consumer price index growth, and change in annual
employment levels" (Alvarez et al. 1991: 545).
The period they examined was 1960 to 1980, and changes in performance within this
time-frame. Lange and Garrett sought to identify the impact of "[...] labor on political-
economic performance outcomes from 1974-1980 [...]" (1985: 802) in light of the growth
between 1960 to 1973. There are methodological issues with this, as addressed below,
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but it should immediately be noted that the oil shock of 1973 highlights a potential
confounder to the variable, namely external shocks.
Economic shocks The degree to which a country depends on imported goods and
gain much of their wealth from exports determine how they are affected by an economic
shock. Garrett et al (1991) account for two varieties of changes in economic realities:
Shocks and systematic changes to economic processes, both of which I apply throughout
the thesis. The former is named Vulnerability to International Economic Conditions and
controls for conditions external to the economy, whilst the latter is named Domestic Eco-
nomic Processes, which are changes in economic performance lagged to show changes
in the domestic economy.
These variables reveal not only whether economic performance was affected by factors
other than the composition of government, but also whether government changed the
structure of the economy. And, all else equal, they can verify that even under extraordi-
nary empirical circumstances – such as a shock in oil prices – their argument holds. In
the analysis I discuss this as changes and shocks to the economic system.
Government Cohesion In Garrett’s words "[...] economic policy should be more
consistently partisan and macroeconomic performance should be stronger the more ’co-
herent’ conditions are in the politics and the labor market" (Garrett 1998: 26). This
is to say that efficient policies are contingent on strong parties, where this strength is
measured by a Government Partisanship variable, or how many seats of the parliament
cabinet the governing party holds (Alvarez et al. 1991: 545). The more seats held, the
more political power the government has, and hence the easier it would be to implement
policies.
Encompassing labor Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange use the variable Labor Organi-
zation which they measure by the density and centralization of union movement (1991:
545). That is, whether the country’s labor movement is sufficiently large to impact wage-
negotiations, and hence the economy at large. Additionally, it is aware of this impact
and will voluntarily restrain itself and prefer long-term wage growth over short-term, as
this growth impacts economic stability. This is conducive to policy-makers as militant
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wage-negotiations could by itself create inflation.
This variable also includes the opposite of an encompassing labor: Weak labor. In this
case, labor is "[...] sufficiently weak and decentralized to be rendered unable effectively
to retaliate against the imposition of market discipline [...]" (Alvarez et al. 1991: 543).
Here, governments of the right will have less resistance when imposing market liberalism.
The strength of this relationship between political parties and labor is contingent on the
strength of the party itself.
The Jackman critique
The argument forwarded by Lange and Garrett was critiqued by Jackman (1987) for its
empirical content and assumptions, as well as for the theoretical linkage between parties
and policy. Their model is based on economic growth between 1974 and 1980, but this is
calculated based on the relative growth between 1960 and 1973. Though not necessarily
an invalid approach, Jackman raises the question of whether the earlier period should be
an explanatory factor on line with labor strength and government cohesion.
Whether thirteen years of growth is comparable to six years, or if a weighted average
would be a more precise measure than simply average annual growth in each period may
be the case (Lange and Garrett 1985: 802). Their sample of countries is also limited as it
includes sixteen "advanced industrial democracies" (Lange and Garrett 1985: 794), and
a bias is introduced by including the case of Norway.
Finally, the effects of leftist strength is questioned, as their results run contrary to similar
empirical analysis. If government cohesion was insignificant, the question of "does who
governs matter?" would be reduced to "does labor matter?". However, Jackman does
concede their central argument, which is:
Through its policy instruments, government can influence both the invest-
ment behavior of capital and the distribution of economic growth among
social classes (Lange and Garrett 1985: 797).
As developed in section 3.3.3, my approach applies their argument using an inherently
different methodology, wherein these issues of quantitative analysis are resolved. Jack-
man further draws the link between their argument and Lipset’s (1960) view that elec-
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tions express a class struggle. Whilst his critique of the assumption that the "[...] state
is ’directly in the hands’ of labor [...]" (Jackman 1987: 254) is justified, a more nuanced
explanation is possible: The state is not necessarily in the hands of anyone, but the
preference-alignment between the left and labor may still explain a prevalence in poli-
cies which are favored by both. The alliance between the left and labor does not imply
that either is dominated by the other, but rather a symbiotic relationship in which labor
fulfils its responsibilities to its members whilst the left gets elected.
The validity of the assumption that partisan politics will yield distinctive policies are
challenged by Downsian policy-convergence, where parties propensity to be primarily
office-seeking and secondarily policy-formulating lead to a converge on the preferences
of the median voter (Downs 1957). Thus, policies would grow ever closer and less
distinctive in order to capture the swing-voters, who reside around the median voter.
Without delving into a technical explanation of the median voter theorem, suffice it to
say that it is a paradox resolved by the empirical variance in policies and by identical
policies disincentivizing voting by leaving no variance in the outcome of an election.
Even if both sides of politics aim for economic growth, the path taken to achieve this can
and will vary. Even without any differences in the outcome for growth itself, social factors
such as distribution can be different without necessarily impacting growth negatively.
Hence policy-convergence of the Downsian sort is unlikely, as both political theory and
the model assumes a distinctiveness to policies of the left and right.
Causality, conditionality, and mechanisms In Garrett et al’s response (1987) to
Jackman three points are worth reiterating and evaluating: An argument of causality, an
argument of conditionality, and what either means for the central argument.
Though the combination of a strong left government and a strong labor union leading
to economic growth may be a positive causal relationship, it is important to recognize
that this hinges on identifiable mechanisms to show this, not on most of the empirical
materials either side of this debate presented. As sophisticated as their methodological
approach is, it does not lend itself to a causal argument, because their quantitative data
does not account for the underlying mechanisms of the issue. The mechanisms of this
relationship will be explored further below, along with an evaluation of whether a causal
relationship holds.
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Their conditionality-argument, however, does seem plausible, and further it also explains
the case of Norway not as a deviant case, but as a potentially crucial case (see Gerring
2007). As already explained, it is not simply the co-existence of a strong left government
and strong labor, but rather an interaction between them that would lead to relatively
strong economic performance. As Garrett et al point out, "Norway’s exceptional growth
in fact reflects its position as both a highly ’corporatist’ and oil-rich country" (Lange and
Garrett 1987: 260, original emphasis). Hence, Norway exemplifies how the strong ties
between the left and labor manifested in strong economic performance, as they became
oil-rich through government efforts (Jackman 1987: 245). In a restatement of why who
governs matter, Garrett et al suggest the following:
The argument is not that political conditions totally determine economic out-
comes, but rather a more modest assertion that politics affects economics at
the margins, and that these margins are nevertheless very important (Lange
and Garrett 1987: 269).
This emphasizes an important point, namely that whilst who governs matters, it is not
the only explanation available. Technological and societal factors, as well as economic
shocks, will all impact the economic performance of various countries. The assumptions
for the explanatory model implicitly involves some degree of dependency on foreign
markets, and this alone will ensure fluctuations in the domestic economy.
Beyond the original argument
After the initial debate, revolving mainly around methodological and empirical issues,
Hicks (1988) respecified the model proposed by Lange and Garrett (1985; 1987) and still
found that the empirical data supported their argument. In what follows, I will outline
this respecification, evaluate its merits, and discuss responses by Jackman (1989) and
Garrett et al (1989; 1991) as well as the further implications.
Hicks’ contributions First, Hicks expanded the model to include two alternative
interpretations: Either labor organization effects are conditional on labor’s political
strength, or labor’s political strength is conditional on union strength. But this does
not suggest that either may produce a "[...] distinct causal process" (Hicks 1988: 682,
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original emphasis). However, as I will show in the analysis, they may be causally-linked
in that labor strength – politically – is contingent upon the presence of a strong left party.
Hence labor organizations are "[...] reinforced by Left party strength [...]" (Hicks 1988:
685).
The argument of conditionality between the strength of labor and the strength of the left
implies that – contrary to economic dogma – redistributive policies do not necessarily
slow down economic growth (Hicks 1988: 699-700). Notably, "[...] union use of wage
restraint is central for growth [...]" (Hicks 1988: 683), and this is an essential mechanism
by which the left-labor alliance can be conducive to growth.
Second, Hicks finds that without Norway, there is only limited support for their argument.
This brings on an impasse: If, in the case-selection terminology of Gerring (2007: 89-
90), Norway is taken to be a crucial positive case, then it is a case of social democratic
corporatism where the relationship between labor and the left does produce economic
growth.
If, on the other hand, it is taken to be a deviant or extreme case, then it is one of possibly
several reasons why the argument fails. Though this does not discount the argument that
who governs matters, it does mean that the empirical basis of Garrett et al’s and Hicks
analysis is lacking. As already specified, my argument is more theoretical and focused
on mechanisms, but the Norwegian case – and possibly similar ones like the Swedish –
does highlight an avenue for empirical evaluation of the prevalence of these mechanisms,
as they are prominent cases of social democratic corporatist systems. This is discussed
in chapter 5.
Third, Hicks outline two economic perspectives that seek to explain economic growth:
The neoclassical growth theory and the efficient allocation approach. The former is
an explanation of how changes in incomes and improvements in productivity predicts
growth, whilst the latter explains how rationality and market efficiency is the source of it
(Hicks 1988: 690). After testing these controls, as well as several others including depen-
dence on foreign oil, he finds that mainly the market efficiency argument is important.
In Hicks words: "[P]rogressive governmental redistribution of income does appear to
reduce growth" (Hicks 1988: 697, original emphasis), which runs contrary to the findings
of Garrett et al.
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In response to Hicks
Jackman (1989) highlights some weak points in Hicks and Garrett et al’s analysis: The
sample of democratic countries could have been expanded to include at least twenty-one
countries which fit into the category of advanced democracies. Though Hicks controls for
the impact of Norway, Austria now becomes an influential case in his expanded model.
However, as I shall demonstrate in the method-chapter, adding cases or expanding the
sample to its utmost extent will not sufficiently explain the mechanism Garrett et al
proposes, nor would it disprove the existence of it.
Jackman points to policy-convergence as a hindrance for distinctive partisan policies
and that the assumption of only two strategies for growth being an infeasible assumption
(Jackman 1989: 652, 654, 658-659). As I have previously stated, policy-convergence
to the extent described by Jackman is unlikely, and the absence of other strategies can
be explained by the simplification of politics into a left and right side of the political
spectrum, rather than a variety of party-types.
This point is stressed by Garrett et al (1989) in their response to Jackman, in that policy-
convergence in itself would in turn make parties formulate distinctive policies. This is
related to whether elections are held on specific issues, or whether policy-formulation
matters. If parties have similar, near-identical policies then issues could be what deter-
mines elections. If they, on the other hand, have different strategies by which they propose
to achieve sustained economic growth, then policy-convergence is unlikely. This presup-
poses parties to have different ideological views which shine through both in elections
and in policy (Garrett and Lange 1989: 682).
When does politics matter?
Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange point out two lines of argument for when who governs
matter:
First, [...] governments can be expected to pursue partisan economic strate-
gies consistently, because these further the interests of the governments’
core political constituencies [...], and second, there are political constraints
on the ability of governments to act on their partisan preferences (Alvarez
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et al. 1991: 539).
These are consistent with my approach to the matter at hand, in that distinctive policy-
means, if not policy-goals, are prerequisites to the explanatory model, and the constraints
upon either are as well. The authors also draw a distinction in policy-convergence be-
tween two-party and multi-party systems, where it can be argued that even in the former
policy-convergence is not guaranteed.
Importantly, government strength and ability to pursue economic policy strategies will
potentially have a beneficial effect with either the left or the right in power (Alvarez
et al. 1991: 540). Further, they outline two hypotheses – essentially the same as the
argument of conditionality – and their variables. As these variables are continuations of
their previous work, no further commentary is given here.
The results are of more interest, and they reaffirm the conditionality-argument, as well
as suggest that economic performance is "considerably better under more ’coherent’
configurations" (Alvarez et al. 1991: 551). Both of these results are as expected, but a
third one, that unemployment results are consistent with structural hysteresis, is more
surprising. The implication is the following: "Shocks raising unemployment are likely
to dissipate more rapidly in countries with more encompassing labor organizations,
irrespective of who governs" (Alvarez et al. 1991: 552).
This has consequences for the political constraints on reducing unemployment, and
suggest another path in addition to simply controlling inflation. In closing, the authors
suggest that further work should more carefully explore the mechanisms "linking parti-
sanship to performance" (Alvarez et al. 1991: 552), which is what I aim to do within the
context of political latitude and economic constraints.
A retrospective In the aftermath of the papers by Garrett et al (1985; 1987; 1989;
1991) and Jackman (1987; 1989), Garrett (1998) emphasized that the distinction between
social democratic corporatism and market liberalism is not just of strategies for growth,
but also that the less cohesive governments are, poorer macroeconomic outcomes should
be expected. This underlines the argument for evaluating empirical cases of political
parties as extreme points on a continuum between social democratic corporatism and
market liberalism.
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3 Method
In this chapter I briefly outline how corporatism has been studied previously, and how
I continue this work. I then account for the main sources of data used throughout the
thesis, and the virtue of triangulation. Further, I lay out an analytical framework for how
the development and impact of corporatism in Sweden will be evaluated. I end with a
discussion of the validity of the chosen methods, possible alternatives, and whether the
Swedish case shows a change in corporatism beyond the domestic.
3.1 Studying corporatism
The approach by Garrett et al (1985; 1987; 1989; 1991), as followed by Hicks (1988), is
a seemingly typical way of examining corporatism. It establishes and verifies differences
between countries, as well as changes over time, and is by and large a quantitative method.
They use a multivariate model with multiplicative interaction terms, meaning that they
consider several variables (X) to affect economic performance (Y), and that it may be
the relative presence or absence of a confounding variable (C) that explains this effect.
This relationship is illustrated in figure 1.
As their area of focus is the relative differences in outcome between governments of
the left and right, they analyse relative differences in performance between them. This
means that economic performance after 1973, in their study (1985: 802), is seen in light
of the growth between 1960 and 1973 rather than in isolation. As discussed in section
3.3, I evaluate this relationship qualitatively and further develop the implications of it
longitudinally. In terms of variables and relationships it appears unchanged, but my
interpretation is more focused on a causal narrative from the 1980s onwards.
My approach is a diachronic single-case study wherein the development of the relation-
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Figure 1: The relationship between government cohesion, encompassing labor, and eco-
nomic performance.
Xa
Government Cohesion
Xb
Encompassing Labor
Y
Economic Performance
C
Institutional Linkage
Lines indicate relationships and arrows causal-links and their direction. Explanatory variables are noted
as X, confounders as C, and outcomes as Y.
ship between government and labor is examined, and the impact this has on performance
evaluated. A single-case research design is optimal for establishing causal mechanisms
(Gerring 2007: 38) and testing the internal validity of these mechanisms. That is to say,
it is a test of whether the relationships proposed in figure 1 hold over time. Note that
the placement of Sweden in the European and Scandinavian context does not imply an
external validity – a broader representativeness of the case – but rather it is necessary for
understanding what Sweden is a case of. I elaborate on this below.
3.2 Sources of data
I utilize various databases that hold generalized accounts of relevant variables, including
data from the World Bank on inflation and unemployment (2014); the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (hereafter referred to as the OECD) on union
density, coverage, and membership (2014); Golden and Wallerstein on union centraliza-
tion (2009); Swank on government cohesion (2013); Statistics Sweden on wages and
inflation (2015); and the European Commissions AMECO database on unemployment
(2014). Several of these use the same sources of data, and thus aid in ensuring consis-
tency between the data. The data is mainly used descriptively, to illustrate the situation
of Sweden in the examined period and to verify empirical impacts.
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The qualitative data used are Pontusson (1992), as well as Hibbs and Locking (1996), on
types of labor movement; Swenson (1992) and Pontusson (2000) on wage-drift; Golden,
Lange, and Wallerstein (2009), as well as Kitschelt (1999), on union density rates, union
composition, and institutional organization; Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (1999), as
well as Edin and Topel (1997), on centralized bargaining; Wallerstein and Golden on
institutional changes through the 1980s (2000); and Erixon on the Rehn-Meidner model
(2008). Key insights about the 1990s crisis are derived from The Economics Commission
(Ekonomikommissionen 1994, hereafter referred to as the commission).
Both quantitative and qualitative data are needed for an adequate examination of the
Swedish case. If only within-case data was used, the broader context of corporatism
would be lost, and the analysis would yield few implications apart from for Sweden in
the 2000s. The application of the European and Scandinavian contexts aid in mitigating
the problem of sample bias (Gerring 2007: 147) by viewing Sweden in relation to
other countries. This triangulation is also necessary to understand what makes Sweden
an archetype of a corporatist system as changes in government, labor, and economic
performance would not be as apparent through viewing it in isolation.
The choice of period is based on the empirical content of the case, as the formation of
the Swedish welfare-model occurred in the first decade after the second World War, and
remained stable up to the second half of the 1970s. Though the main focus lies on the
changes in the 1980s and the consequences for the 1990s, parts of the later 1970s are
included to better contextualize these changes historically.
3.3 Analytical framework
From the literature review it is clear that the theoretical argument relies on an empirical
basis, and it would be disadvantageous to try to separate them. The quantitative data
aids in illustrating the empirical effects of the changes to the left-labor linkage, and
the qualitative data explains what these changes entailed. Further, a path-dependent
perspective is used to explain the causal relation between these, and also develop an
explanation of how the institutional changes shaped economic outcomes.
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Case selection and empirical approach
As established in section 3.1, it is the internal validity of Sweden as a case of a corporatist
system that is of interest. For the analysis to hold value it is necessary that this validity
be evaluated sequentially, as the suggested impact of the institutional linkage may not
be present past the 1970s.
Bleaney (1996) highlights that both corporatism and centralization are concepts which
cannot easily be quantified between countries. Because of this, adding cases to expand
the sample to a multicase analysis would not increase the analytical outcome; placing
Sweden in a larger context will sufficiently answer the research question. Yet, whilst
the selection of the Swedish case is seemingly the theoretically and empirically correct
choice, a broader and more generalizing study might find a more apt case of corporatism
or its decline. However, in this time period no other capitalist democracy is more of a case
of social democratic corporatism than Sweden, nor do comparable countries outperform
it on the explanatory variables. I discuss this further in the two following chapters, and
return to the question of validity in section 3.4.
3.3.1 Economic performance
As have already been established, economic performance is expected to vary only marginally
between social democratic corporatist and market liberalist countries. In this sense there
are no significant levels or clear cut-off points where one is better than the other, es-
pecially because the relationship may be a probabilistic one. It becomes a causal rela-
tionship only if the left-labor linkage can be established as a mechanism that affects
performance.
It is important that this mechanism is at least shared between two points of analysis
for internal validity to hold. Because of this it is necessary to choose a case in which
a single country experienced a shift from a leftist government to a rightist one, or vice
versa. Between the 1970s and 1990s several such cases exist, but as noted Sweden is an
exemplary case of corporatism, and experienced changes to government cohesion, labor
centralization, and performance.
The nature of corporatism is that it is advantageous for the actors involved, thus the ex-
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pected enhanced performance must necessarily be visible for the theoretical assumptions
to hold. To show this performance is examined through several variables, as discussed
in section 2.2.2, and it illustrates the effects of changes to government and labor, as well
as to the policy-strategies of either side of politics. I return to these empirical results in
chapter 5.
3.3.2 Left-labor linkage
The close ties between the left and labor is an important explanatory factor, and from
the literature review it seems both likely and plausible that the strength of this linkage
allows the left to successfully grow the economy and maintain high employment without
negatively affecting inflation. An identification and explanation of this mechanism must
start with an examination of the welfare-model prior to its period of change.
One way to examine the empirical impact of this linkage is through wages, which are
expected to follow prices. To the extent that assumptions about political influence over
wage-setting hold, wage-policy is seemingly the area where the agreement between the
left and labor occurs. This appears to be a result of the linkage, and a potential overlap
between membership in a labor union and the left-wing party could be a prominent
explanation of this. With close ties between them it would not be surprising that wage-
policies can be agreed upon, and that wage-negotiations are easier for the left with an
encompassing labor.
If the left manages to impose a moderate wage-policy which gains them the support of
labor, they will have the political support needed to implement their preferred economic
policies. This is, of course, with the proviso that this support is sufficiently large to win
the election. Hence, a coherent left can create growth whilst controlling unemployment
if their alliance with labor ensures stable conditions for the members of the labor unions.
This is further discussed in the next chapter.
Constraints on policy-formation
As should be clear from the discussion and assessment in the theory-chapter, the margins
which constrain policies are both subject to variations between countries and idiosyn-
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crasies within countries. From the review of theoretical perspectives and literature there
is an indication that the assumption of distinctive policies is at least partially verified
(Garrett 1998: 121-124). Schmidt finds support for the plausibility of this argument and
further suggests that the inability of capitalist democracies1 to control both inflation
and unemployment whilst growing the economy "[...] indicate the limits of corporatist
political control of a capitalist economy" (1982b: 255-256).
This shows an empirical constraint where parties are limited in what can be achieved by
economic policies, as keeping a stable labor force whilst growing the economy and trying
to balance unemployment against inflation implies careful use of economic policies. This
reiterates the argument that political impact on performance may well be marginal, and
potentially unnoticeable during economic crises. Furthermore, the effect of political
influence may not be clear in the short-term.
3.3.3 Methodological Approach
To analyse the implications of the changes to Sweden, I place it in a nested analysis,
described by Lieberman as the following: "It combines the statistical analysis of a large
sample of cases with the in-depth investigation of one or more of the cases contained
within the large sample" (2005: 435-436). The application will become apparent in the
following chapters, as I move from Sweden as a prominent case of corporatism in a
European context to placing it in the smaller sample of comparable cases in Scandinavia.
Whether the Scandinavian countries are comparable is discussed in section 6.3.2.
The aim is, following Lieberman’s terminology, to build a model of corporatism in
Sweden and analyse its development between three distinct periods: The 1980s and
the decades prior and subsequent to it. Note that this is an analysis of causally-linked
factors which are assumed to be important for the outcome. The analytical focus lies
on changes in the explanatory variables and their relation, not on numerical variance in
the outcome. Following Ragin’s (2004: 126) approach for case-oriented research, I have
clarified conceptual and empirical scope, identified causal conditions of a positive case,
and placed it in a theoretical perspective. From this it is clear that causal-links, and the
convergence or divergence between them, must be identified and examined in order for
1Using 21 cases between 1974-1978 (Schmidt 1982b: 242).
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Sweden to be placed in a meaningful theoretical and empirically broader context.
Establishing significance qualitatively As will be examined in the analysis, the
relative significance of the effect changes and shocks have on the Swedish system can-
not be established conclusively. This is inherent to qualitative methods, as there is no
definitive way of determining whether the analysis is robust because other paths or mech-
anisms leading to the outcome may be revealed through later analysis or by alternative
methods (Lieberman 2005: 436, 438 fn. 6).
Because of this, the impact of these changes and shocks should rather be evaluated
in terms of robustness of findings and whether the explanation is plausible in light of
previous research. The analysis assesses the proposed effects derived from theoretical
expectations, empirically and methodologically, and the implications are evaluated in
light of the literature reviewed in the theory-chapter.
Path-dependence and institutional change
The examination of the development of the linkage and the variables over time requires
consideration of a causal connection between them. That is to say, the analytical frame-
work for exploring institutional change over this period of time depends upon strict
causal-links between changes and outcomes. I have hinted that movement towards mar-
ket liberalism, whilst not inevitable, is hard to oppose given an increasing degree of
economic integration in the world. A by-product of globalization, it implies a type of
convergence towards common policy-goals and policy-solutions to economic and finan-
cial issues. That is, convergence between countries, not necessarily between political
parties.
I take the view that this development can be evaluated as path-dependent, a process which
is self-reinforcing. Path-dependence is defined as the following: A "dynamic process
involving positive feedback, which generate multiple possible outcomes depending on
the particular sequence in which events unfold" (Arthur 1994; David 2001, as referenced
in Pierson 2004: 20-21). In Arthur’s terms this means that the ultimate consequences of
a change are not foreseeable, the change would be hard to reverse, it could lead to larger
consequences, and finally that the end outcome would not necessarily be intentional or
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optimal (Pierson 2004: 18).
The value of this approach is that it allows for analysis of causal relationships. The
effects of the changes in the 1980s are, as discussed in further chapters, not necessarily
connected, and an analytic perspective on the developments is a better answer to the
research question than a descriptive one.
Determinism Systemic changes can be viewed as critical junctures, from which there
are limited paths forwards. This makes certain outcomes inevitable, in the sense that di-
vergence from the path created by these critical junctures is unlikely. In the long-term,
developments along one path will preclude movement towards alternative paths. Hence
there is a potential deterministic character to the historical development of Sweden. As-
certaining whether the junctures are causally linked or arbitrarily concurrent is then im-
portant, as the theory does not predicate a certain sequence of events. Further discussion
focuses on the shifting nature of economic development, and junctures are subsumed
into the terminology of systemic changes.
The analysis will treat economic shocks explicitly to identify and establish these links
as separate from systemic changes, which entails placing changing political choices
and constraints in sequence, where static mechanisms can be differentiated from self-
reinforcing ones. The difference between the two are the following: A static mechanism
can be generalized to any model, as it is the unchanged path through which an outcome
occurs. A self-reinforcing mechanism, however, is inherently dynamic and changing,
and specifically it is a path which over time makes the shift towards other paths more
difficult. Thus the sequence of events from changes in the 1980s to the consequences
for the 1990s may by its very nature be deterministic and path-dependent, because it
reinforced this path whilst eliminating divergence from it in the short- to medium-term.
This is developed further in the analysis.
3.4 Validity
It should be stated that the chosen method is not the only way of conducting a study of
corporatism. In addition to the approach by Garrett et al, discussed in section 2.2, it would
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also be conceivable to study several cases to establish whether these mechanisms hold for
a larger group of countries. Using two similar cases with variance in the outcome would
establish the external validity of the proposed relationship, and using two different cases
could potentially disconfirm or highlight domain restrictions for the internal validity.
Two similar cases would imply an analysis of mainly social democratic corporatist
regimes, as was the focal point of Garrett et al, whilst using two dissimilar cases would
extend the argument to expose what mechanisms yield a similar outcome in market lib-
eralist regimes. However, analysing a single case at distinct or at disjunct periods allows
focus on variation in the independent variables rather than in the dependent, illustrated
by changes in the outcome. As my focus is explicitly on the interplay between the left
and labor – and the historical development of this – the study of a single, prominent case
of a corporatist regime over time is more apt.
Further, previous research has already established that partisan differences can yield
marginally different economic outcomes, and explaining the mechanisms of this is a
more worthwhile exercise for contributing to the academic debate than reiterating this
result.
The causal perspective
It should also be noted that the path-dependent perspective is inherently idiosyncratic: A
similar or comparable development of a corporatist system may not have occurred, and
especially the causal-relation of changes to outcomes may be unique to Sweden in this
time period. The proposed answer to the question which this thesis asks may then not
hold relevance for other cases. However, several of the highlighted developments were
not unique to Sweden, and point to the need for a re-examination of corporatism more
broadly. This might aid in disconfirming whether these changes are indeed particular to
Sweden, or if a broader decline in corporatism on the same basis can be observed. This
thesis is, however, mainly concerned with the case of Sweden.
The linkage and its impact on performance can also be confounded by technological
change, societal idiosyncrasies, ideological impacts, or other factors which affect gov-
ernment cohesion or labor strength. However, following the research design developed
by Garrett et al over the years (1985; 1987; 1989; 1991; 1998) it should be possible to
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control for these confounders sufficiently enough to evaluate mainly the mechanisms,
using empirical data to test their effects.
Evaluating the welfare-model In the next chapter I perform a descriptive case-
study of Sweden in the 1980s, with a focus on how the system of centralized bargaining
changed. This empirical examination will identify the relationship between the left and
labor more clearly, as well as establish why Sweden is an archetype of a corporatist
system.
As the institutional linkage between the left and labor may only be revealed empirically
it must be established before the impact on performance is examined. A qualitative
evaluation of Sweden as a case of corporatism is thus necessary, and I follow this with an
identification of whether the institutional linkage is mechanistically related to enhanced
economic performance. The purpose is ultimately to explain the Swedish system, and to
develop this narrative beyond the 1980s.
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4 Changes in labor
In this chapter I examine what changed in regards to the encompassing labor variable, and
discuss the development of the centralized bargaining mechanism. Though the analysis
is limited to the 1980s and the early 1990s it depends on a contextual understanding of
the development of social democratic corporatism (SDC) over a longer period of time.
For this reason I reference earlier developments and include data that cover the period
prior and subsequent to the 1980s to more clearly illustrate changes that occurred within
this decade, and to contextualize the empirical material.
I begin with a brief examination of the empirical basis of the encompassing labor variable.
This is followed by an account of how wage-bargaining is organized, and how this
changed in the 1980s. I end by considering corporatism, outlining the importance of
government cohesion for centralized bargaining, and illustrating the updated view of the
explanatory model.
Unions and institutions Throughout this chapter I refer to the various unions and
institutions by the acronym or shorthand for their original name. For the sake of clarity
the following list summarises the aforementioned and gives a short description of their
classification. See section 4.2 for an explanation of the different types of unions.
Glossary
LO Landsorganisasjonen: Unitary, peak-level blue-collar union.
Metall Svenska Metallindustriarbetarförbundet: Craft-fragmented, regional industry-
worker union.
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SACO Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation: Unitary, peak-level academics union.
SAF Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen: Peak-level employers-union.
TCO Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation: Unitary, peak-level white-collar union.
VF Verkstadsförening: Craft-fragmented, regional industry-employer union.
4.1 Encompassing labor
Sweden has one of the highest union density and coverage rates in the OECD. Density
is defined as the "ratio between actual membership and potential union membership"
(D’Agostino 1992: 17), and in Sweden it ranged from 66 to 84 percent in the examined
period, compared to 32 to 49 percent in the OECD1. Coverage is defined as "the propor-
tion of employees who are covered by collectively bargained contracts" (Golden et al.
1999: 202) and here expressed as the amount of union members. In Sweden it ranged
from 1.9 million to 3.3 million compared to an average of 2.1 million to 3.6 million in
the OECD2, also during this period. This is illustrated in figure 2.
An explanation of this level of density and coverage begins with the voters captured
by the left. Kitschelt highlight three dilemmas of explaining political parties choice,
limitations, and programmatic variance, of which his organizational dilemma is:
[B]etween a party’s commitment to an internal organization that facilitates
strategic flexibility and responsiveness to changing "tastes" in the electorate
and an organization that captures a loyal "core electorate" (1999: 321).
This "core electorate" is the working class in Sweden, whose "tastes" are represented by
the various unions. As discussed in the theory-chapter, the size of these unions must in
aggregate be sufficient to cover a majority of the voters for them to show wage-restraint.
As shown in the top plot of figure 2 it was clearly the case that the unions covered a
large part of the labor force, also in comparison to the OECD. Whilst the membership
rate of the OECD was higher but declining at the start of the 1980s, the growth since the
1The lowest average density for a country within the OECD was Korea with 14 percent, and the highest
Iceland with 83 percent on average.
2The lowest average coverage for a country within the OECD was Luxembourg with 74 thousand
members, and the highest the United States with 19 million members on average.
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4 Changes in labor
Figure 2: Union Density and Coverage
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1960s was sustained in Sweden – as seen in the bottom plot of figure 2. This indicates
that coverage, rather than membership, may be a better explanation of the effect of large
unions. This and the assumption of a tight-knit and overlapping relationship between a
large union and a leftist government must be examined empirically, and I do so in section
6.1 of the analysis.
4.2 Centralized bargaining
Golden and Pontusson (1992: 14) highlight three types of labor movements: Craft-
fragmented, politically-fragmented, and unitary. The first is organized on the basis of the
profession, rather than the employer. The second on the basis of ideological appeal and
political affiliation. The third cuts across craft and political divisions, thus encompassing
them both. This typology is tied in with the organization of wage bargaining, which
can be located at three distinct levels: Plant, industry, and peak. This hierarchy of wage
formation is described by Hibbs and Locking as such:
[A] central framework agreement negotiated by the peak union and em-
ployer associations (LO and SAF), followed by industry bargaining, and
then plant level negotiations to implement arrangements contracted above
(1996: 112).
Thus, LO is a unitary, peak-level organization, whose size and level of bargaining makes
it necessary to cooperate with the government on wage-policies. Note that this top-down
system of bargaining is exactly what is meant by a centralized system: The benefits
negotiated by the peak-level union are shared with unions on the lower level, and their
organizational structure will, given an adequate size, be beneficial rather than detrimental
to changes in wages. As explained in section 2.1.3, large union membership coupled
together with a high degree of union density implies wage-restraint by the unions.
4.2.1 Rehn-Meidner model of wage-bargaining
To explain the basis of centralized bargaining in Sweden, the work of two trade-union
economists at LO should be pointed out: Rudolf Meidner and Gösta Rehn, whom the
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Rehn-Meidner model is named after. The model aims at "combining full employment
and fair wages with low inflation and high economic growth" (Erixon 2008: 367). These
goals clearly are desirable, but it is the models focus on wage-policy solidarity and the
implications of this that is of greater interest.
Erixon suggest that labor market policies emphasized mobility rather than job-creation,
thus fostering employment through a renewal of the workforce (2008: 369) rather than
the Schumpeterian creative destruction of business (see Cox and Alm 2008). This runs
contrary to the vertical Phillips curve and its natural rate of unemployment, in that
reducing unemployment beyond this level implies a rise in inflation. The Phillips-curve
must be located historically for its impact to be understood: Whilst this trade-off was
well understood even before the 1980s, academic dissent on the policy-implications
of it arose during the 1980s (Gordon 2009). Regardless, the trade-off is an important
component of the Swedish case in the context of the 1980s and the decade prior and
subsequent to it, as it gives an indication to what explains the low unemployment.
Furthermore, and as previously discussed, the centralized bargaining between large
unions will ensure wage-restraint that contains inflation through wage solidarity. In
essence, it advocates that wage-compression – raising the floor and lowering the roof
of wages, thus reducing the distance between top- and bottom-earners – will be as con-
ducive to growth as a free market model (Erixon 2008: 369-370). The Rehn-Meidner
model can be summarized as the following: Its strategy "imposes lower costs in terms
of inequality and inflation in comparison with a ’free’ market strategy", and it is unique
in its combination of "full employment and equity with price stability and economic
growth" (Erixon 2008: 379, 385).
4.2.2 Effects of centralized bargaining
The occurrence of central bargaining is in large part because of union membership and
composition (Edin and Topel 1997: 158), and as already specified, in Sweden the union
density rate was high during the 1980s (Golden and Wallerstein 2009). With this cover-
age, and a limited number of coordinated unions – LO, TCO, and SACO (Wallerstein
and Golden 2000, Golden and Wallerstein 2009) – Sweden certainly was an instance of
a country with an encompassing labor movement.
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The peak-level coordination followed from LO’s pivot towards more wage-policy sol-
idarity, with the intention of reducing differences in wages between union members
(Edin and Topel 1997: 158). Thus, in addition to being a stabilizer of wages through
wage-restraint, unions can also lead to wage-compression between industries – as was
the case in Sweden (Edin and Topel 1997: 160). This wage-compression ensured that
union members wages followed a similar trajectory relative to changes in the cost of
living. The trajectory held from the early 1960s up until the mid 1970s, at which point a
divergence between real wages and real wage cost occurred. This divergence widened
significantly at the beginning of and was sustained throughout the 1980s (Edin and Topel
1997: 163).
Wage-drift Another facet of this wage-compression is wage-drift, that is, plant-level
agreements on wages "usually exceeded contractual provisions" (Swenson and Pontus-
son 2000: 81). A development of the model in the 1960s was that peak-level agreements
would include the expected cost of wage-drift up until the next agreement, and this led
to further wage-increases as lower level unions expected to be able to regionally and
locally negotiate margins on top of the central agreement (Swenson and Pontusson 2000:
86). These margins was a cause of inflation, a point which is further discussed in section
6.3.1 of the analysis.
4.2.3 Towards decentralization
The implication is that the Swedish model of centralized bargaining for a long time
ensured both stability in wage-setting and that wages tracked economic growth relatively
closely, essentially rendering it a success up until the 1980s (Pontusson and Swenson
1996: 226-227). In the 1980s, however, the picture is more complex, and I will discuss a
handful of notable institutional changes that occurred.
1983: Initial break
In 1983, as a response to SAF being unwilling to cooperate on the peak-level with
LO (Wallerstein and Golden 2000: 117), VF, the employer association for engineers,
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enticed their industry-union, Metall, away from peak-level bargaining with the offer of
higher wages (Swenson 1992: 52; Pontusson and Swenson 1996: 228). This was the first
major break in centralized bargaining, and VF had argued that peak-level "agreements
hindered recruiting by underpaying skilled workers" (Edin and Topel 1997: 160). The
argument was essentially that peak-level agreements were not as effective in delivering
wage-outcomes as earlier, demonstrated by VF offering higher wages than LO did.
Hibbs and Locking identify several prominent effects of this breakdown: Wage-compression
disappeared, the unemployment rate started increasing, and expansionary policy took
place in the form of currency devaluation (1996: 133-137). Though closely related
to inflation, currency devaluation is not covered here3. Without centralized bargaining,
wage-compression is inherently improbable, as every union thus reverts to the logic of
not being adequately large to have an incentive to show wage-restraint. It then follows
that the system itself moves further away from the ideal of SDC, because unions operate
in what more closely resembles a market-system.
Empirically it is clear that centralized bargaining had brought forth a great wage-compression
between 1965 and 1983, but after decentralization had taken root by the mid 1980s this
was moving towards a reversal, though the wage-differentiation after 1983 was not as
prominent as the compression that had taken place before this (Edin and Topel 1997:
159-160; Hibbs and Locking 1996: 111-112).
1985-1986: Migration from the model
Peak-level agreements had not altogether stopped after 1983, and in further wage-negotiations
between LO and SAF in 1985-1986 they occurred again (Wallerstein and Golden 2000:
117). This time the negotiations focused much more on increases in, rather than the
distribution of, wages (Pontusson and Swenson 1996: 230). When unions no longer gain
expected outcomes from being part of a larger coalition of unions, then the rationality of
large unions quickly breaks down. It is expected behavior by smaller unions competing
for utility-gains for their own members to then leave the coalition. However, union size
– both in absolute and relative numbers – continued to increase throughout the 1980s.
Hence there is an indication that it is not the size, but composition and focus, of unions
3The analysis discusses these devaluations in detail.
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that matter for explaining the efficacy of corporatism.
This has implications for further analysis. First, a change in this mechanism can occur
without a devolution of the unions. Relative to the OECD, Sweden maintained most of its
union density and coverage to the end of the 1990s. If, however, the composition – that is,
the operational capacity – of unions matter more for the sustenance of SDC, Sweden is an
example of how large unions can contain wage-differentiation despite loosing bargaining
power. There is then an indication that, despite a breakdown in centralized bargaining,
Sweden was able to maintain a high level of union power, but converged towards the
economic performance of Europe and the OECD4.
Second, the focus of the unions is clearly an explanation of this. The alliance between
VF and Metall made the position LO had previously held unsustainable, because it relied
on the support of other unions to maintain centralized bargaining. What this implies for
Sweden as a case of a SDC is expanded upon in section 4.3 below.
Past 1986
In an effort to contain inflation and wage-militancy, Finance Minister Feldt of the Palme
Cabinet worked towards increased wage-differentiation between the public and private
sector, and after 1987 the automatic wage-drift had ended (Swenson 1992: 58) and did
not occur in the 1988 bargaining round (Wallerstein and Golden 2000: 117). This was
an important change because it moved Sweden further towards market liberalism (ML),
where wages in the public sector are not expected to keep up with wages in the private
sector. This change can be illustrated by Feldt’s comments on the OECD:
The conditions of the OECD changes [...] The economic policies shatter.
[...] The old models no longer work and the international cooperation will
in the 1990s be of more importance than in the past (quoted in Ståhlberg
1986, my translation).
A common line of thought among scholars have been that centralized bargaining "has
become less efficient or less feasible over time" (Wallerstein and Golden 2000: 108). I
would argue that in the case of Sweden it has become less feasible, and though previously
4See chapter 5 for results and trends in economic performance.
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highly centralized it has become more economically efficient in a classical economic
sense, but centralized bargaining less so because of this. In 1990 SAF decommissioned
their bargaining department, and after the resignation of the Social Democratic govern-
ment in 1992 over failed measures to contain union militancy, their successors were not
interested in maintaining the system of centralized bargaining (Wallerstein and Golden
2000: 118). Thus, by the early 1990s the centralization of wage-bargaining had ended,
and unlike other Nordic countries it did not resurface in the examined period (Wallerstein
and Golden 2000: 132).
4.2.4 The effect of a decline in corporatism
Though the development of the Swedish case is not indicative of an international develop-
ment, it exemplifies what a decline in corporatism entails. The breakdown in centralized
bargaining had the effect of marginally limiting the political capacity available for se-
curing high employment and containing inflation. The operative word in the previous
sentence is marginally, as this effect should not be overstated. The welfare state and
relation between unions and the government in Sweden did not completely dissolve, and
it remains one of the clearest examples of SDC.
However, the changes of the 1980s and early 1990s do show that Sweden was not actually
as much of an outlier or exemplary case as first assumed. The breakdown of centralized
bargaining brought it closer to the European and OECD average in terms of economic
performance, as seen in the next chapter, but it still maintained an encompassing labor.
Hence, Sweden remains a case of one of the most corporatist countries in Europe and
the OECD, but the developments of the 1980s brought it closer to a ML system, and the
implications of this are discussed in the analysis.
4.3 Viability of the argument
The case-study shows how the breakdown of centralized bargaining took place, and it is
more broadly an indication of a decline in corporatism. This can be summarized as the
following: The dissolvement of centralized bargaining has diminished wage-restraint,
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and thus weakened union power in the labor market. This was a structural change indi-
cating movement towards market liberalism, and a decline in corporatism.
Confirming or disconfirming this will answer whether changes in the organization of
labor did in fact affect economic performance, and it will also have implications for
whether Sweden at the end of the 1990s should still be regarded as the clearest example
of SDC in Europe or if it then had moved closer to ML.
Government Cohesion
Though not explicitly a part of the centralized bargaining mechanism, government cohe-
sion should be addressed as it is an operational part of the explanatory model. As will be
made clear below, the institutional overlap between the government and the largest labor
union in Sweden ensured that the governments of the examined period were cohesive.
As previously discussed and as specified by Garrett et al (1991) this conditional impact
of a leftist government paired with an encompassing labor is present in Sweden for most
of its post-war history. There were, however, some exceptions to this. Between 1976 and
1982, and again between 1991 and 1994, Sweden was governed by parties of the right. In
the former period this was the cabinet of Thorbjörn Fälldin, then Ola Ullsten, followed
by Fälldin again. In the latter it was the cabinet of Carl Bildt (Swedish Government
Offices 2015). This development is illustrated in figure 3.
Importantly, the shifts in government power explains some of the changes in centralized
bargaining. This mechanism relied on cooperation between the government and labor,
but the right had less of an interest in maintaining it. Of course, the system itself was a
cause of inflation – a point I return to in the analysis – but without the continued regime
of the left it was much harder for labor to remain encompassing and for wage-restraint
to continue.
4.3.1 An updated view of the explanatory model
Figure 4 illustrates the causal mechanism – centralized bargaining (M) – between the in-
stitutional linkage (C) and economic performance (Y). The dissolvement of the strength
of this mechanism is centered around 1985-1986, but stretches from 1982 into the early
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Figure 3: Government Cohesion in Sweden
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1990s. Hence, the mechanism that historically has ensured stable growth along with low
unemployment in Sweden broke down.
Figure 4: An updated relationship between government cohesion, encompassing labor,
and economic performance.
Xa
Government Cohesion
Xb
Encompassing Labor
Y
Economic Performance
M
Central Bargaining
C
Institutional Linkage
Lines indicate relationships, dashed lines weakened relationships, and arrows causal-links and their di-
rection. Explanatory variables are noted as X, mechanisms as M, confounders as C, and outcomes as
Y.
As highlighted in section 2.2.2, corporatism – in the case of Sweden and more generally
– should be viewed as a dimension with SDC and ML on either end of a continuum. This
is because the former is implicitly a system where corporatism plays a larger part in the
organization of society, whilst in the latter it does not. The empirical implications of this
are examined in the next chapter.
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5 Economic performance
Whether corporatism declined must be examined further, as it is a necessary component
of the answer to the research question. To do this I examine the development of perfor-
mance, and particularly its changes towards and into the 1990s. This chapter presents
empirical data and analysis of this, with the purpose of more clearly evaluating Swe-
den as a corporatist system and to ascertain how corporatism affected performance in
empirical terms.
I begin with a discussion on theoretical expectations, and their relevance for the potential
decline in corporatism. This is followed by the presentation of empirical results relevant
to the explanatory model, especially in regards to performance. I end with a summary
and the implications these results have for the analysis.
5.1 Expectations
The outlined theoretical expectations below are a continuation of the previous narrative
of the 1980s, and describe how the examination of performance will be conducted. It
includes four empirical levels: The European Union (EU), the OECD, Scandinavia, and
Sweden. The broader contexts, Sweden in the EU and as a part of the OECD, illustrate
why Sweden is a prominent case of corporatism, and how its performance compares to
a much larger sample of countries. The Scandinavian context is employed to show how
performance compares between similar countries, and how it is impacted by changes and
economic shocks. Scandinavia normally comprises Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, but
for a more comprehensive comparison I follow Jonung’s (2008) use of the term which
includes Finland, because it also experienced several of the changes and shocks along
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with its neighbouring countries1 (Glyn 2006: 69). See section 6.3.2 for a discussion on
the comparability of these countries.
5.1.1 Decline in corporatism
One expectation is that the breakdown in labor unity should yield relatively poorer per-
formance in the medium- to long-term. It should be clear from the case-study that the
relative dissolvement of centralized bargaining is an indication of a decline in corpo-
ratism, but this must be substantiated empirically. Note that any impact on performance
must be weighed against the shocks that occurred, which I do in the analysis.
The conditionality-argument
I have already clarified why economic performance will not necessarily depend upon the
presence of an encompassing labor whilst the left is in power, nor the absence of it whilst
the right is. However, it remains the case that an alliance of the former or the occurrence
of the latter should yield higher and more stable performance over time.
This is certainly shown in the Swedish case, where both stable growth and a continued
regime of leftist governments are explained by the sustained labor-left alliance between
1950 and 1975. As previously noted, Lange and Garrett suggest that a linear relationship
between growth and labor should not be expected (1985: 801), and correlating growth
with labor would not adequately account for exogenous factors such as the early 1990s
crisis nor control for statistical confounders such as union size without union centraliza-
tion. Further, such a correlate would not establish this linkage in the period prior to the
1980s, as it lacks instances of rightist control of government or weak labor power. Nor
would it in the 1980s, because of the previously specified breakdown in left power and
labor organization.
Clearly, the 1980s is distinct from the prior and subsequent period. Hence, a continued
relevance of the left and labor as explanatory factors needs to be established beyond
their relation prior to the 1980s. How this is done is considered in section 6.1. For now,
1The term "Nordic countries" is often applied to this group, but also includes Iceland. "Scandinavia" is
preferred because of the inclusion of a relevant case, rather than the exclusion of an irrelevant one.
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it should be noted that the continued performance of Sweden up to the early 1980s is
explained by a stable left-labor alliance, and that this picture changes from the mid 1980s
to the mid 1990s. I continue with a revisit of Garrett’s analysis of counterfactuals.
Predictions and results of counterfactual analysis
Garrett’s (1998) analysis of partisan differences in economic performance is much in
keeping with previously specified political goals and constraints, namely: Parties must
necessarily win elections to implement policies, there is a trade-off between inflation
and unemployment, and there are partisan differences in preferences for this trade-off
(Garrett 1998: 29). This trade-off, and the preference of parties for relieving either in-
flation or unemployment, is still important. It explains, first of all, the move towards
deregulation and price-stability by the governments of the right. More importantly, and
as highlighted in section 6.3.2, unemployment became a bigger problem than inflation in
the late 1980s and during the 1990s crisis. The direction of influence between Swedens
political parties and the world market on inflation is uncertain, as deregulation in itself
created a less restricted market, but it can be assumed that the lack of solutions to the
rising unemployment problem was something that should have been prioritized – which
the left is more prone to do.
In the case of Sweden, whose government was controlled by parties of the right in the first
half of the 1980s and the early 1990s2, it would be expected that combined with a strong
– if less centralized – labor this would yield more market-oriented economic policies, and
poorer macroeconomic performance relative to a more cohesive regime (Garrett 1998:
47-49). Garrett finds that "Left power was associated with stronger economic growth.
Inflation was higher where labor market institutions were more encompassing" (1998:
122)3, and both the effect of the left and the right in government will be shown by the
results below and further discussed in the analysis. I now turn to examining these findings
using empirical data from the 1960s onwards.
2See figure 3 on page 44.
3Based on Garrett’s determinants of growth, unemployment, and inflation – tables 5.2-5.4 (1998: 115-
119).
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5.2 Results
In what follows I examine how performance developed, by evaluating growth, unemploy-
ment, and inflation. Note that the consequences of these results are mainly discussed in
the next chapter, whereas this presents them along with implications for the upcoming
analysis.
5.2.1 Growth
Prima facie, Garrett’s finding appears to be correct: The trend line for Sweden, in the
bottom plot of figure 5 indicate that growth was higher in the 1960s and declining towards
the 1990s. The picture is more nuanced than this and probably significantly affected by
economic shocks of the latter half of the period, but growth in Sweden remained above
two percent until the early 1970s, and dropped into the negative in the early 1990s.
This illustrates that the expected outcome is confirmed for the earlier period, but not
from the 1980s and onwards as neither left power nor encompassing labor are expected
to hold. However, as shown in the three upper plots of figure 5, the trend in growth is
not unique to Sweden. The EU, the OECD, and Scandinavia all experienced a decline in
growth, as shown by the slopes in the legend of figure 5. Though the shift for the left and
labor appears to have affected performance, the effect may be too marginal to measure.
In the analysis this development is discussed in light of the crisis of the early 1990s.
Cohesion and temporality As suggested by Garrett et al, economic performance
should be better in countries with more cohesive regimes (1991: 551). Implicitly this
means that such comparative performance occurs between-country, but there is an un-
derlying question to whether this also applies within-country in distinct periods. Perfor-
mance in Sweden prior to 1975 should be better than between 1975 and 1995 – the latter
period being one in which the government changed control several times. As discussed
throughout this chapter, there are economic shocks which could distort this picture, but
the assumption may still hold. The picture of the development of performance is highly
sensitive to the timing of the impact of the aforementioned shocks, and because of this
the empirical data should be viewed as indicators of an impact of the changes and results
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5 Economic performance
Figure 5: Growth rate in the EU, the OECD, Scandinavia, and Sweden
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of the shocks. This distinction is important, as changes in the government cohesion and
encompassing labor variables do not necessarily predict changes in performance that can
be measured in isolation from the impact of confounding variables, such as an economic
crisis.
5.2.2 Unemployment
It is clear that unemployment was significantly lower in Sweden than in the EU and the
OECD, and only at the shift between the 1980s and the 1990s did it converge towards
their rates. It is also apparent that whilst the rate was generally lower at several points in
time it spiked along with spikes in unemployment in the EU, the OECD, and Scandinavia.
This is shown in figure 6.
The expectation that shocks to unemployment should dissipate faster "[...] in countries
with more encompassing labor organizations, irrespective of who governs" (Alvarez et al.
1991: 552) is tested by comparing the rate of change in the Scandinavian countries. As
noted, these countries experienced the crisis of the early 1990s on similar terms, but the
unemployment rate or the rate of change did not perform markedly better in Sweden.
As shown in the top plot of figure 7, Sweden deviates from both the Scandinavian norm
and its Scandinavian neighbours seen together when considering unemployment. This
might indicate that the remainder of Scandinavia is less comparable than assumed, that
the shocks had different impacts on these countries, or that Sweden is an outlier in terms
of this impact.
From the mid to the end of the 1990s Sweden had both a higher rate of unemployment
than its neighbours, and a slower dissipation of this rate than the Scandinavian average
and the Norway, Finland, and Denmark average, shown in the bottom plot of figure
7. The rate of change in unemployment is more volatile in Sweden at the time of the
OPEC-crisis and the early 1990s crisis. Though such spikes are expected, the theoretical
expectation that these shocks should dissipate faster does not appear to hold. After the
first spike the rate does show less volatility than the Scandinavian countries as a whole,
or Norway, Finland, and Denmark in isolation. After the second spike, however, Swedens
unemployment appears more volatile than the other Scandinavian countries.
There are of course national differences in the impact of the crisis, but the indication is
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Figure 6: Unemployment in the EU, the OECD, Scandinavia, and Sweden
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5 Economic performance
Figure 7: Unemployment in Scandinavia
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that the shock did not dissipate faster in Sweden despite its higher levels of union density
and coverage. A comparison of these levels are shown in figure 8. This disconfirms the
expectation of faster dissipation, with the proviso of potential idiosyncrasies between
the Scandinavian countries.
Figure 8: Union Density and Coverage in Scandinavia
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Female participation in the workforce Nuance needs to be added in regards to
unemployment and participation in the labor-force, as the view I have presented thus far
have focused on total unemployment and an unchanged participation rate. Österholm
(2009) shows that whilst the unemployment-rate did spike in the early 1990s, there is
a discrepancy between this rate for males and females, as well as between their partici-
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pation rates. Unemployment did not increase as much for women, and the participation
rate for males decreased slightly. Notably, the participation rate for women increased
substantially between 1970 and the early 1990s, and it would appear that this to some
degree dampened the effect of the crisis on unemployment, even if marginally.
5.2.3 Inflation
In contrast to growth and unemployment, where Sweden clearly performed differently,
inflation moved more or less together with the inflation in the EU and the OECD (Erixon
2008: 375). From 1975 to 2000 it decreased substantially for all three areas, which
may be related to the increased focus on price-stability and central bank independence,
discussed in section 6.3.1. As shown in the top plot of figure 9, Swedens inflation spikes
at the time of the OPEC-crisis and again in the turnover from the 1980s to the 1990s. The
same happened to unemployment, and it shows that Swedens performance – regardless
of domestic organization of labor or government – follows similar patterns to the EU,
the OECD, and Scandinavia. The bottom plot of figure 9 reiterates that, apart from a
spike towards the 1990s, Sweden for the most part performed on par with its corporatist
Scandinavian neighbours.
Importantly, and as discussed in section 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 of the analysis, inflation is ex-
pected to be more volatile than growth or unemployment, and also sensitive to both
domestic policy and changes abroad. The analysis also discusses the implications this
has for the trade-off between inflation and unemployment.
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Figure 9: Inflation in the EU, the OECD, Scandinavia, and Sweden
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5.3 Implications for analysis
Whilst it may be correct that the combination of a leftist government and a strong labor
may yield better economic performance, this appears only marginally verified for Sweden.
Growth was higher prior to the 1980s, but only slightly more than in the EU, the OECD,
or Scandinavia, and further it was more volatile than any of these aggregate areas. Note,
however, that growth is not inherently comparable between Sweden and the larger areas
as they have the benefit of trade-balances not affecting the data as much. The rate of
change is therefore exaggerated for Sweden, and the trend line a better measurement.
Unemployment, on the other hand, is notable in the Swedish case. Until the 1990s it
outperformed both the EU, the OECD, and Scandinavia. The expectation of a faster
dissipation, however, was disconfirmed. As noted above, inflation appears the anomaly
here, as it for Sweden appears to have been no better or worse than the EU, the OECD, or
Scandinavia. Even compared to Scandinavia, or its Scandinavian neighbours, Swedens
inflation does not stand out. The reasons for this are further discussed in the analysis.
The analysis must take into account that there is no uniform or theoretically set amount
of lag in which the effects of shocks and changes occur, so care must be taken when
weighing the various effects against one another. It is clear that several areas should be
explored in the analysis:
• Institutional overlap between the left and labor, which was assumed in the earlier
period, should be evaluated in the 1980s and 1990s. A decline in this overlap
would show that not only centralized bargaining, but also union influence over and
direct participation with the government, declined; as expected when government
power changes hands.
• Inflation, both in terms of levels and development, needs to be revisited method-
ologically and in light of theoretical perspectives.
• The highlighted changes in centralized bargaining, government cohesion, and the
left-labor linkage, as well as the shock of the economic crisis, must be accounted
for to determine which developments were of most importance to corporatism.
• Whether or not the changes of the 1980s impacted political latitude in dealing with
the crisis of the 1990s must be considered.
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• To what degree performance is explained by partisan differences in economic pol-
icy, and if this truly relies on cooperation with labor. If not, enhanced performance
may be better explained by differences in policy, or other factors.
As will be evaluated in the analysis, a variety of economic decisions made by politicians
led to the crisis in the 1990s. That is not to say that it was intentional, or that they did
not foresee the consequences, but rather that Sweden would appear to have followed suit
with financial deregulation along with many other European countries at a time when
several structural problems of the Swedish economy were surfacing. While it is not
surprising that governments of the right moved the country towards market liberalism,
it is important to note that this use of political latitude had major consequences for the
country.
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6 Analysis
In this chapter I examine how the changes and empirical effects of the 1980s had con-
sequences for the 1990s. This is followed by a discussion of the inevitability of this
development, and how this led to the economic crisis of the 1990s. Finally, I consider
the implications of this perspective, and the consequences the changes of the 1980s and
1990s have had for Sweden as a case of corporatism.
6.1 Left-labor linkage and overlap
In order to establish and analyse a continued linkage between the left and labor I briefly
examine the institutional overlap empirically in this period, and delimit the impact this
has had by discussing it in a temporal perspective. Note that this is done fully within
the context of Sweden, and the results are not put into a larger context. The purpose of
this is to identify any definitive changes in how the institutions relate to one another and
wage-setting after the break in the mid 1980s.
The decline and subsequent break in centralized bargaining in the early to mid 1980s
indicate a decline in corporatism, and this break removed unions incentives for wage-
restraint, as they then fought over benefits for their own members rather than for labor
as a whole. The inevitability of this chain of events is discussed in section 6.3, but I first
consider involvement in the wage-bargaining process.
As seen in the top plot of figure 10, both the involvement of labor unions and the govern-
ment in the wage-setting process remained stable until the early 1980s, at which point
labor got markedly less involved and the government stepped in. This is as described in
section 4.2.3, and it can be clearly seen that the subsequent involvement spiked for both
labor and the government during the crisis. In the bottom plot the degree of centralized
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bargaining is shown, and as expected there is a correlation between it and involvement.
The middle plot reiterates cohesion along with elections, and when seen in relation to
involvement in the top plot, two things are clear: There are no obvious temporal links
between the level of government involvement in the bargaining process and economic
performance1, nor between the highlighted shocks and shifts in government. The expec-
tation of a partisan effect on performance is seemingly disconfirmed, as it cannot be
ascertained between 1975 and 1995. This is because changes in economic policies are
time-sensitive and slow to take effect, and marginal impacts are obscured. This does not
mean that there are no political impacts on performance, but rather that the movement to-
wards market liberalism is unlikely to have apparent effects this time period. The impact
of cohesion, however, may still be visible and is discussed in section 6.3.1.
It also shows that centralized bargaining did not break down completely, and in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s it returned in a moderate form. The implications are not straight-
forward, but worth noting: Changes in the 1980s, whether they were short-term political
or economic ones, or structural problems surfacing, explain the occurrence of the 1990s
crisis, but there are no clear causal paths between them. Hence, the left-labor linkage
might have dissolved, but the unions still had to work with the government – regardless
of whether the left or the right was in power. In regards to the relative difference in per-
formance between the two sides of politics, the degree to which labor aligns with either
remains important. Though not as powerful a mechanism as previously, their potential
wage-militancy could further increase inflation. However, since the this wage-drift ended
before the crisis it should not have had this effect in the late 1980s and the 1990s.
1See figure 12 for changes in wages relative to inflation and figure 11 for a summary of the historical
performance of Sweden.
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6 Analysis
Figure 10: Left-labor Linkage
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6.2 Performance
Examining the overall performance of Sweden in this period, it is clear that growth de-
clined whilst both unemployment and inflation increased. This is shown in the trend lines
of figure 11. At the end of the period the changes in all three indicators of performance
appear to be subsiding. The main conclusion from this is that the highlighted shocks
were temporally limited in scope. But, importantly, the changes were structural: The
left-labor linkage, heavy regulation, government cohesion through many years of left
rule, and centralized bargaining had all dissolved. A re-institution of any of these, or
a return to the economic performance they produced, is unattainable in the short-term,
untenable in the medium-term, and improbable in the long-term. This follows from
the path-dependent argument: The crisis, an event typically regarded as limited in time,
could not be solved in the immediate short-term as performance was too unstable. The
government could, and did, make an effort to contain it, but the problem was nevertheless
not solvable whilst the crisis was ongoing. In the medium-term policy was needed to
bring unemployment down, keep inflation in check, and bring growth back to stable lev-
els. Given the structural problems of inflationary wage-setting and high unemployment,
inflation eventually became a more pressing issue than unemployment, and stabilising it
took time.
Particularly deregulation is a self-enforcing process, and with time it is expected to yield
better economic performance due to the nature of the market, and reinstating an earlier
regulatory regime can take years. The structural characteristics of the Swedish welfare-
state were built and reinforced over many years, it took many changes and economic
shocks to reverse them, and by this logic a return to the situation prior to the 1980s
would also require years of development. Hence these structural changes illuminate the
historical development of the economic system and economic performance of Sweden
in this period, and have important implications for political latitude, discussed in section
6.4.
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Figure 11: Performance in Sweden
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6.3 Path-dependent changes
I have described the chain of events that constitute this development as inevitable, but
the changes are rather one of several possible outcomes. This discrepancy stem from
the difference between probable outcomes and self-reinforcing processes, as examined
in section 3.3.3. The path from a breakdown of centralized bargaining to the crisis is
one in which the events are causally-linked, and thus they are not arbitrary changes that
occurred alongside shifts in government power and a changing economic system, but
rather a sequence of events that led Sweden towards market liberalism.
Related to the central argument then is the plausibility of such a sequence, and the im-
plications this has. It is a theoretical expectation that without the left-labor overlap the
linkage would dissipate too, but this is disconfirmed empirically. Labor must necessarily
cooperate with the government or employer-unions on some level to achieve increases in
wages, regardless of what level of centralization is involved in this process. Thus, whilst
there are significant changes which constitute the development from Sweden prior to
the 1980s to the end of the 1990s, none of the identified changes indicate a complete
dissolvement of the relationship between government and labor. The implication is that
whilst the left may be more prone to cooperation with labor, and possibly have a larger
overlap of preferences for policies, the expected drop in performance from the right cou-
pled with a relatively encompassing labor is not visible. That is, the drop in performance
is better explained by shocks such as the crisis, whilst the circumstances that allowed for
the severity of the crisis are best explained by the systemic changes.
6.3.1 Policies leading to the crisis
In 1992 the commission, mentioned in section 3.2, was tasked to analyse the crisis and
suggest solutions to it, and it was their view that high unemployment was "the most
serious consequence of the present economic crisis" (Lindbeck and Ekonomikommissio-
nen 1994: 6). Two factors are particularly important pertaining to the trade-off between
unemployment and inflation: That unemployment was identified as the most serious
consequence of the crisis, and inflation as necessarily volatile and high due to the de-
valuation of the Swedish krona. Implicitly, controlling unemployment is made more
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difficult by inflation being out of control. The cause of this situation in the 1980s, and
the implications it had for the 1990s, warrants further discussion.
Control over inflation and unemployment
Central bank independence may be relatively unnoticeable in a crisis, as many other
factors would obscure the effect of politicians controlling it, but in the medium- to long-
term there is a theoretical expectation that this independence leads to greater stability, as
discussed in section 2.1.4. For the Swedish central bank, Riksbanken, this did not come
until 1999 (Daunfeldt and de Luna 2003: 19), but as early as 1990 it had started focusing
more on inflation than unemployment (Englund 1999: 89). This shift in institutional
focus can be explained by the natural rate of employment, which is a part of a shift in
economic theory in the 1980s: From a previously Keynesian perspective, monetarism
took over as as the new paradigm, and inherent to it is the natural rate of unemployment
(Grauwe 2007), as also discussed in section 2.1.4. From this perspective unemployment
cannot be altered by government policies in the long-term, and thus there is little reason
to do so in the short- or medium-term other than to temporarily lower it at the cost of
inflation.
With inflation already soaring as a result of devaluations and integration with interna-
tional markets, lowering unemployment would imply an even higher inflation. If we
accept the plausibility of a natural rate of unemployment, which the economic literature
has, it would be futile for governments of the left or the right to take control of unemploy-
ment during the 1980s or early 1990s. The reason is not explicitly favoring monetarism
over Keynesianism, but rather that the short-term benefits of lowering unemployment
would not outweigh the adverse effects this would have on inflation.
This constrained political solutions to unemployment. Policies could be implemented
to avoid a long-term structural problem, but the large increase at the start of the 1990s –
shown in figure 11 – could not be countered. This is another instance of a path-dependent
process, where previous political choices exclude the viability of potentially desirable
subsequent ones. Even if unemployment was recognized as being as much of a problem
as it was later regarded, lowering it was made difficult by the path set by devaluations
and deregulation.
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The impact on growth
In section 2.2.2 I discussed how cohesive governments should be more optimal for
stable growth compared to less cohesive ones. This perspective, and the expectation that
deregulation leads to a more efficient market and thus increased growth, needs further
evaluation. As shown in figure 11, growth declined whilst unemployment and inflation
rose. Hence, a decline in performance was visible through the 1980s and it bottomed out
in the 1990s.
As government power changed hands several times between the late 1970s and mid
1990s, the impact of cohesion is as expected. However, the decline in growth presents a
confounder: The economic changes that Sweden went through – though volatile – should
have created growth in the long-term, but the fall in government cohesion should lead
to less growth. Weighing cohesion against economic change is not a straightforward
procedure, especially in this limited time period, and thus no clear answer to the impact
on growth is available by the methodological approach used.
A potential explanation of this confounder is that growth – and unemployment – is a
sticky measure, as its performance one year is significantly affected by its performance
the previous year. Growth may even be stickier than unemployment, in that manipulating
the output of a country is more difficult than manipulating inflation or unemployment.
This stems from the temporal limitations of latitude, where inflation – and to some de-
gree unemployment – can be adjusted to alleviate conjunctural issues in the short-term,
whereas facilitating growth requires investment in the medium- to long-term. Deregula-
tion should then, along with other economic and political changes of the 1980s, create
higher growth. But the effects of this would perhaps not be seen for several years or a
decade or more after the end of the crisis. Any policy aimed at increasing growth in the
examined period would be subject to two notable constraints: The implementation of
policies takes time, potentially several years, and the desired effect of the policy may not
be attainable given the economic and political environment. The first constraint relates to
the time-lag involved in policy-making, and the second to how the shifts in government
makes such long-term policies inherently difficult to maintain across shifts in power.
In a related perspective, the breakdown of centralized bargaining was then a necessary
precursor for deregulation and the subsequent crisis to take place. The commission notes
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it as the following: "For Swedish industry to preserve its international competitiveness
and its market shares, it has been necessary for its relative unit labor cost to fall" (Lind-
beck and Ekonomikommissionen 1994: 138). That is, as wages fell relative to prices2
and the economy was opened up to the international market through deregulation, the
cost of labor3 fell with the breakdown in centralized bargaining. So the change from the
period prior to the 1980s was a necessary change for the changes from the 1980s to the
1990s to occur. I develop this causal-path further in section 6.4.1 below.
Inflationary system of wage formation
Though the breakdown of centralized bargaining is identified as defining for the change
in corporatism, it should also be identified as a cause of the change in wages in the
mid 1980s. The previously discussed wage-drift, which was inherent to the system of
centralized bargaining, kept wages relatively stable in relation to inflation. The effects
of the wage-drift were presumed to ensure that wage-growth followed price-growth, but
this would appear to have ended even before centralized breakdown did. As shown in
figure 12, inflation and the change in wages diverge around 1975 and at the start of the
1990s-crisis, but converge again in 1985 and to some degree after the crisis.
No definitive conclusion can be drawn from this. Despite performance as a whole not
being substantially affected by the 1973 OPEC-shock, it appears that inflation was. But
there are no clear indications of a manifestation of the effects of the breakdown of central-
ized bargaining on the relationship between wage-rate and inflation-rate, and certainly
not that centralized bargaining necessarily and solely caused this divergence. This has
been identified as a collision between the fixed exchange-rate and the inflationary system
of wage formation in the 1970s and 1980s (Lindbeck and Ekonomikommissionen 1994:
2-3), which the data shows, but because this does not present as a change or shock in
the mid to late 1980s it cannot be subsumed into the causal narrative. Rather, inflation
appears to be driven more by external factors than by wage-drift after 1973. This is then
one of the structural economic factors which created the preconditions for the crisis, but
it does not emanate from the explanatory model, and is therefore excluded as a causal
link.
2Shown in figure 12. Note that prices are especially sensitive to inflation.
3The cost of labor is costs in wages and capital, thereby affected by changes in wage-rates.
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Figure 12: Wages and inflation in Sweden
19
50
19
55
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Year
Wage growth Inflation rate
Measured in percentages. Wage growth is change in nominal wages, adjusted for price changes. Data
source: Statistics Sweden 2015.
However, it is expected that the breakdown would cause not only short-term, but also
medium-term divergence between wages and inflation. This is an instance of where
this temporal scope cannot be clearly defined, as for example the 1980-1995 period
can be evaluated as both short-term and medium-term in regards to what changed. The
divergence of wages from inflation, lasting from approximately 1973 to 1992, should be
evaluated as the medium-term because this period includes most of the identified changes,
shocks, and effects. Further, even though the breakdown is placed in the mid 1980s the
breaks between unions occurred prior to this, and so the confluence of effects between
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the breakdown and Swedens currency devaluations could explain the long period in
which wage-growth no longer trailed inflation-growth (Jonung 2008: 568).
Financial deregulation
Jonung identifies Swedens financial deregulation as the source of a period of "[...] over-
full employment, rising consumption and falling savings ratios" whilst monetary policy
was focused on maintaining the fixed exchange-rate (2008: 569-570). Note that the fixed
exchange-rate to some degree binds the country to the inflation-rate of the country to
which the exchange-rate is fixed, and the Swedish krona was not changed to a floating
rate until late 1992. Before that point in time it would be regarded as an overvalued cur-
rency (Lindbeck and Ekonomikommissionen 1994: 24, 32), which explains the multiple
attempts to devalue it. More important is the impact on inflation, which in any crisis
would preferably be under domestic control. In the context of this crisis it undoubtedly
had a significant impact on Swedens inflation-rate.
The difficulty of accounting for causes and effects within the deregulation process should
be noted, as the impact from the integration of international financial systems on perfor-
mance may be significant. In Englund’s words, this integration "[...] has undoubtedly
increased Swedish dependence on international interest rates" (1990: 290). This relates
to the fixed exchange-rate, and more broadly to the change in the inflation-rate in the
1980s. Inflation is a contentious point of analysis in this time period, because the inher-
ent volatility of it will have to some degree been impacted by the OPEC shocks of the
1970s, the deregulation in the 1980s, and the 1990s crisis. Because of this, changes in
inflation should be viewed as a confounder to performance. That is, it is not part of a
path-dependent process, but it is contextually relevant as a part of the narrative. Growth
and unemployment are, as noted, both sticky measures. Inflation, on the other hand, can
be presumed to be a volatile measure in a stable economy, as it responds to conjunctural
shocks, and much more so in periods of larger shocks or crises.
As shown in figure 9 on page 56, inflation in Sweden did not vary significantly from
inflation in the EU or the OECD, despite the shocks that occurred in Sweden. However,
as I previously indicated, it is the relation of wages to inflation that are important, rather
than inflation itself. I previously described this as wage-compression being inherent to
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the welfare-model. The telling part of figure 12 is then that wages and inflation did move
towards compression by the end of the crisis and the end of the 1990s. Hence, though
wage-compression may seemingly have stopped with the breakdown of centralized bar-
gaining, this is not necessarily a permanent or certain outcome.
Whilst deregulation is easily assumed as a cause of the crisis, a more nuanced picture is
available: Deregulation is more aptly considered in the context of the economic boom
in the late 1980s, where the efficacy of monetary policy was constrained by a fixed
exchange-rate, and the outcome compounded by an expansive fiscal policy. Pre-existing
and increasing inflation, necessary to sustain the currency devaluations, was then a more
severe problem than deregulation. Further, this created a situation where inflation was
high and the real appreciation of prices continued, which "[...] made Sweden a natural
target for international speculation [...]" (Englund 1999: 96). This speculation created
a currency crisis, which fiscal policy was unable to contain by devaluations alone. Fi-
nally, the banking sector was unprepared for the rapid deregulations, and the rate of
expansion for the financial part of the economy was high enough that an environment of
increased risk-taking took hold, and as such the banking sector to some degree sustained
the crisis.
6.3.2 The 1990-1993 crisis
The economic crisis of the early 1990s can be termed a banking crisis, as its starting point
can be identified as the financial breakdown of three large banks which occurred shortly
after a real estate bubble burst at the end of 1989, which created a "[...] severe real estate
and financial crisis [...]" (Lindbeck and Ekonomikommissionen 1994: 4; Englund 1999).
Many political and economic factors leading to it can be identified, and importantly it
explains much of the economic performance in Sweden in this decade. By examining
crises and their roots and consequences, Englund finds that the Swedish crisis was not
unique in origin or development (1999: 80-81, see Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache
1998). Furthermore, the volatility in the Swedish currency was at least part of the problem,
as it created an ongoing real appreciation of the exchange-rate from six devaluations
between 1973 and 1982 (Englund 1999: 81).
These devaluations were necessary, in part, to sustain the rapidly developing financial
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markets: A stable currency towards the international markets were desirable, and dereg-
ulation was a part of this integration. This deregulation, as previously discussed, was
not unexpected but it was not followed by substantial changes in monetary or fiscal pol-
icy, both of which were necessary to dampen its effects (Englund 1999: 83-84). It is
telling that the finance minister resigned in February of 1990 over the lack of support
for restrictive fiscal policy, as it in hindsight is clear that this was necessary to ensure a
stable growth of the financial market in this period. However, as Englund suggests, using
"[...] deregulation as the key explanation for the crisis [...] may be too simplistic"(1999:
95-96), as it was more a cause of the depth of the crisis.
The aforementioned collision between the fixed exchange-rate and strongly inflationary
system of wage formation in the 1970s and 1980s was precursory to the crisis, but the
commission also identifies that the policies prior to these decades achieved close to full
employment through high public sector employment and wages following inflation of
prices. Devaluing the currency and maintaining a high inflation is implausible in the
long-term, but it sustained the welfare-state. The sustenance of the Swedish welfare-
model is then constrained by economic factors which make both full unemployment
difficult and a continuation of the status quo of the economic system untenable. In the
commissions view Sweden reached a critical point of steep inflation, laggard growth,
unsustainable public expenditures after a decade of financial deregulation, poorly timed
tax reform, insufficient fiscal policy, and misplaced public sector cuts (Lindbeck and
Ekonomikommissionen 1994: 207-209).
Differential impacts in Scandinavia In the context of Scandinavia, Sweden does
not stand out as clearly as in the European context. It remains the most relevant case of
social democratic corporatism because of the initial design of the welfare-model, and
the breakdown of centralized bargaining is the most striking feature of the Scandinavian
countries in the 1980s (Iversen 1996: 402). It is important to recognize that even though
these countries typically are regarded as prime examples of corporatist systems, there
are differences in their development through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s: The outcome
was different for Denmark (Jonung 2008), and the process of breakdown in centralized
bargaining was most prominent in Denmark and Sweden (Iversen 1996: 402). They
remain, however, inherently comparable by the timing of deregulation and the subsequent
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crisis.
6.4 Implications and consequences
From the analysis it can be seen that the various changes and shocks shaped both the
outcome and the development of the Swedish case. The implications of this begin with a
continuation of the development of causality as inherent to the path-dependent process,
followed by a discussion of corporatism within this process. The observed outcome
from the shocks were not guaranteed by the observed changes, but taken together they
indicate definitive movement towards market liberalism. For politicians, or economists
for that matter, there was little at the start of the 1980s that would indicate an economic
meltdown a decade later, but it can be deduced from the theoretical expectations that the
movement towards market liberalism – as expected of a rightist government – implies
somewhat of a shock to the economy.
This perspective has important implications for whether a decline in corporatism is
apparent in Sweden, or whether the changes and shocks did not have a lasting effect.
6.4.1 Causality
The path to the outcome in the 1990s is, as mentioned, not determined or explained by
probabilities in outcomes, but rather from a narrative of causally-linked factors. It is from
the theoretical expectations and careful study of the case-material that this development
is specified. The purpose and result of the analysis is identifying which changes were
significant4 and how they shaped the empirical outcomes. These changes were:
• Government cohesion was weakened by the turnover in government power from
the left to the right, thus ending the regime of the left.
• Labor was weakened by the breakdown of centralized bargaining, and this also
weakened the linkage between the left and labor.
• Markets were deregulated, and especially the financial and banking sectors were
4See section 3.3.3 for a specification of significance in this context.
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affected, and thus political solutions to the crisis were limited.
• Wage-drift, inherent to the system of centralized bargaining, ended.
And the outcomes were:
• Growth declined and the volatility of the economy led to a crisis.
• The currency was devalued, which increased inflation and kept it high.
• Unemployment increased, and the level of inflation made lowering it untenable.
Deregulation integrated the domestic economy more with the international financial
market, and devaluation kept the currency somewhat stable, but together they created op-
timal conditions for the crisis. Below I graph the causal-relationships (see Gerring 2011:
228-230) identified as a revised view of the Swedish welfare-model from section 3.1,
expressed in figure 13. It illustrates an empirical context where economic and financial
turmoil had occurred, and the central bank was still under political control.
Figure 13: A revised relationship between government cohesion, encompassing labor,
and economic performance.
Xa
Government Cohesion
Xb
Encompassing Labor
Ma
Central Bargaining
C
Left-labor linkage
Mb
Wage-drift
Mc
Deregulation
Md
Devaluation
Ya
Unemployment
Yb
Inflation
Yc
Growth
Lines indicate relationships, dashed lines weakened relationships, and arrows causal-links and their di-
rection. Explanatory variables are noted as X, mechanisms as M, confounders as C, and outcomes as
Y.
The period of time between 1982 and 1995 is where the effects of all these changes are
most clearly seen. The breakdown of centralized bargaining ended the inflationary wage-
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drift, but currency devaluations kept inflation high regardless. This clearly impacted
performance, and as discussed several of these effects are causally-linked to performance
during and after the crisis. As figure 13 shows, the impact of inflationary wage policies
(Mb) have ended by this time, but deregulation (Mc) and devaluation (Md) still affect
inflation (Yb). Though noted as government cohesion (Xa) here, this also encapsulates
government itself and its policies, hence the causal paths from Xa to Mc and Md. These
two mechanisms, both instigated by government intervention in the economy, along with
the weakening of the left-labor linkage constitute the main movement of Sweden towards
market liberalism.
6.4.2 Corporatism
This revised view have important implications aside from impacts on economic per-
formance. As discussed in section 5.1.1, corporatism is expected to have declined in
the examined period. In chapter 4 and 5 it became clear that Sweden was not only an
exemplary case of social democratic corporatism, but more so than its Scandinavian
neighbours. As have been demonstrated in the analysis, corporatism declined in Sweden,
which indicates that at the end of the 1990s it was located closer to market liberalism
than previously. Whether or not this remained the case into the 2000s and beyond is
left unanswered, but it is clear that several of the changes in the 1980s are structural –
that is, hard to reverse. The economic shock of the crisis, inflation caused by currency
devaluation and financial integration are mainly problematic in the short-term and not
expected to remain beyond the 1990s. There is also an empirical indication of this visible
in figure 11, where performance appears to move towards a less volatile level.
The mechanisms of deregulation and devaluation are then illustrative in how much
impact government has on the economy. The former is also associated with the economic
policies of the right, and an expected precursor to financial integration with international
markets. The movement towards market liberalism, though apparent, is only indicative
of the Swedish case at large: It is the shift from the cooperative regime of the left and
labor that instigated most of the significant changes, and it is antecedent to them. It may
be explained by shifting preferences in the voters for policy – economic or otherwise
– or by the accumulating inflation from the sustained focus of the government on full
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employment. However, the aim here has not been to explain the shift itself nor causes of it,
but rather how the shift lead to subsequent changes and shocks to the economic system.
Whilst it may be true that corporatism, inherent to the left-labor alliance, maintained
stable performance for a long period of time, its decline was inevitable. Hence, the
Swedish case conforms to theoretical expectations from the Garrett et al debate and a
decline in corporatism is confirmed.
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7 Conclusion
This thesis has addressed the question of "Does Who Governs Matter?" by evaluating
the relationship between government and labor. The answer to the research question
is that the organization of labor did change in the 1980s, and this demonstrably led to
changes in partisan influence on economic outcomes. The findings and implications
were produced using a qualitative approach, where the issue is typically regarded in a
quantitative manner. The applied method limits the generalizing power of the thesis, but
allowed for more thorough analysis of the Swedish case and the underlying mechanisms
of corporatism.
A decline in corporatism was expected from the changes in the 1980s, and further that
these changes should lead to poorer economic performance in the 1980s and 1990s. The
development of the Swedish case in these two decades show that though corporatism
declined, partisan influence on performance – which at the outset is assumed to be
marginal – could not adequately be weighed against the impact of economic shocks and
the crisis of the early 1990s. The empirical material employed covers the organization
of labor, the cohesion of government, and performance from the 1950s to the end of
the 1990s – where data was available. Europe, the OECD, and Scandinavia where used
for comparison, but the results are inherently idiosyncratic because of the institutional
configuration and development of Sweden.
The most notable change of the 1980s in the organization of labor was a breakdown of
centralized bargaining, which was inherent to the Swedish corporatist system. This pro-
cess had ensured workers that their wages trailed prices closely, and maintained support
for the left party. A shift in government power also occurred, as the left lost their control
over parliament after a continuous reign of more than 20 years. This shift indicated the
end of centralized bargaining, but more importantly a decline in the previously close
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cooperation between the left and labor.
Prior to the 1980s the corporatist system ensured low unemployment and high growth
– though with relatively high inflation – for most of the period that the left held power.
This is in the literature explained as a cohesive government yielding enhanced economic
performance, as the the left maintained the support of labor. Though centralized bar-
gaining ended and the left lost power, labor maintained a high level of union density
and coverage, and as such a situation of an incohesive government arose when the right
gained power. That is, cooperation between parties of the right with the labor unions was
more difficult than for the left, and economic performance suffered as a result, though
marginally.
The unclear partisan influence on economic performance in the 1980s and 1990s did not
stem from an incohesive government, but rather from the economic shocks of the 1970s,
the systemic changes of the 1980s, and the economic crisis in the early 1990s. Whilst
Sweden conformed to theoretical expectations about a decline in economic performance,
this decline is better explained by other factors. The thesis makes the case that the
changes of the 1980s are causally connected to the performance of the 1990s, in that
currency-devaluation and deregulation allowed the subsequent crisis to occur. Further,
many of the systemic changes of the 1980s stemmed from the shifts in government power
and decline in labor unity.
However, whilst the economic turmoil – which started subsiding after 1993 – was a
result of temporary shocks and a crisis, the systemic changes remained and indicate that
Sweden in this time period experienced a decline in corporatism. From a previously high
level of collaboration between the left and labor – characteristic of social democratic
corporatist system – the country moved towards market liberalism. Whilst Sweden re-
mains an exemplary case of labor power with strong corporatist roots, the decline in
corporatism is evident.
As the changes Sweden went through were not unique, the implication of this decline is
that a broader decline in corporatism may be discovered through studying other cases.
Further research should explicitly evaluate labor power and unity in a cross-case study,
within the same empirical scope, and potentially whether the wage-compression that
resulted from centralized bargaining may serve as a check on income inequality.
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